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A COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL POLICY TO STOP
HUMAN CLONING: AN ANALYSIS OF THE HUMAN
CLONING PROHIBITION ACT OF 2001 WITH
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FEDERAL AND
STATE LEGISLATURES
SHAWN E. PETERSON*
"THE FIRST HUMAN CLONE,"'-that headline signaled to
the world that what before was only science fiction now had
become reality. U.S. News & World Report broke the story that
Advanced Cell Technology (ACT), a small biotech firm in Massa-
chusetts, had succeeded in creating the first human embryonic
clone.2 This announcement came just four months after the
House of Representatives passed the Human Cloning Prohibi-
tion Act of 2001 (HCPA), s which was designed to prevent such
cloning. President George W. Bush also supports the HCPA4 and
has denounced all kinds of human cloning.5 Many European
countries have condemned the U.S. company's creation of a
human clone as well.6 Despite consistent pressure from House
members, the Bush Administration, and the international com-
munity, Senate Democrat leaders stalled the passage of the
* J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2003; White Scholar, Thomas
J. White Center on Law & Government, 2001-2003; B.S., Business Economics &
Public Policy, Indiana University, 2000. Special thanks to Matt T. Nelson & Pro-
fessor G. Robert Blakey for their assistance and suggestions in developing this
policy paper.
1. U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Nov. 25, 2001, at cover.
2. Joannie Fischer, The First Clone, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 25,
2001, at 51, 52.
3. Human Cloning Prohibition Act, H.R. 2505, 107th Cong. (2001). This
bill will be analyzed in the form that it was reported in the House of Represent-
atives on July 27, 2001. This Act seeks to add §§ 301-02 to Title 18. For this
Note, all pinpoint cites will provide a parallel and usually a more detailed cite to
the proposed text in a corresponding parenthetical.
4. See Ronald Brownstein & Aaron Zitner, The Nation, Bush to Urge Senate to
Ban All Cloning, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2002, at A1.
5. Laurie McGinley & Antonio Regalado, Bush Criticizes Firm That Clones
Human Embryos, Presses for Ban, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2001, at A4 (quoting Bush
as stating that "[t]he use of embryos to clone is wrong... [and that we] should
not, as a society, grow life to destroy it").
6. See Gautam Naik, U.S. Company's Clone Creation is Decried in Europe as
Governments Weigh Ethics, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2001, at A4.
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HCPA and have yet to allow a full vote on the HCPA or another
similar bill.7
The human cloning debate has been brewing since the Ros-
lin Institute's announcement on February 22, 1997 that its scien-
tists had cloned a sheep, the first successful cloning of an adult
mammal.8 After that announcement President William J. Clin-
ton issued an executive order prohibiting the use of federal
funds for cloning research involving human embryos.9 In addi-
tion, President Clinton ordered the National Bioethics Advisory
Commission (NBAC) to thoroughly review the various legal and
ethical considerations involving human cloning and to issue a
report with recommendations within ninety days.' 0 The NBAC
issued its report on June 9, 1997 and concluded that human
cloning was "morally unacceptable."1 1 The NBAC recommended
that President Clinton continue withholding federal funds from
such research.' 2 Moreover, the NBAC urged private actors to
refrain from cloning humans 3 and asked Congress to pass anti-
cloning legislation.'"
Attempts to pass legislation restricting human cloning fol-
lowing the NBAC's recommendation failed in the Senate in
1998.15 Nevertheless, six states have passed human cloning bans,
but these bans alone, as shown by ACT's experiments in Massa-
chusetts, are hardly enough to prevent cloning in the U.S. In the
spring of 2001, federal proposals to ban human cloning resur-
faced as a reaction to a vigorous public debate over whether the
federal government should fund embryonic stem cell research.' 6
Part I of this Note will overview the science of human clon-
ing, which is necessary to understand the ethical and political
7. See McGinley & Regalado, supra note 5.
8. See NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, CLONING HuMAN BEINGS 1
(1997) [hereinafter NBAC REPORT].
9. Cloning Technology: Scientific Developments and Current Guidelines, 77
CONG. DIG. 35, 38 (Feb. 1998).
10. Letter from William J. Clinton, President of the United States, to Har-
old Shapiro, Chair, NBAC, 33 WKLY. COMp. PREs. Doc. 237 (Feb. 24, 1997),
reprinted in NBAC REPORT, supra note 8.
11. NBAC REVoRT, supra note 8, at 108.
12. See id. at 109.
13. See id.
14. Id. The Commission suggested that such legislation should include a
"sunset" provision, which would cause the legislation to expire and force the
Congress to reevaluate its cloning stance in the near future.
15. See Clark D. Forsythe, Human Cloning and the Constitution, 32 VAL. U.
L. REv. 469, 470-71 (1998) (describing the various proposals offered and their
differences that led to a stalemate in the Senate).
16. See Megan Garvey, House Approves Strict Ban on Human Cloning Science,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2001, at Al.
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issues surrounding the various proposals and statutes discussed
throughout this paper. Part II will briefly survey the interna-
tional response to human cloning. Part III will summarize the
various types of federal proposals, including the HCPA. Part IV
will analyze the HCPA, critique its constitutional authority, and
present the most prominent constitutional challenges of the Act.
Part V will propose several changes to the HCPA to increase its
effectiveness and to strengthen its constitutional foundation.
Part VI will briefly describe the five state cloning bans that are
currently in effect. Part VII will analyze a proposed state ban and
will recommend changes to strengthen state cloning bans. The
ethical foundations surrounding cloning policies are discussed in
Part VIII. Finally, this Note concludes by calling for a compre-
hensive national policy against human cloning.
I. A SCIENTIFIC OVERVIEW OF HuMAN CLONING
To understand the legal, political, and moral issues revolv-
ing around the HCPA, a brief overview of the scientific and his-
torical issues surrounding human cloning is necessary. The
purpose of human cloning is to genetically replicate a human
being.17 A human cell contains a nucleus that holds chromo-
somes, which carry genes,18 and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is
"the substance of the gene."' 9 Moreover, "[a]lmost all of the
DNA in a cell is contained in the nucleus, and virtually every cell
in the human body contains a human being's complete genetic
code. "20
A healthy human ovum and a human sperm each have
twenty-three chromosomes. 2' During fertilization a process
point called syngamy occurs where the ovum and the sperm
unite to become one entity. At that point, a new "individual
member of the species homo sapiens sapiens-or human
being-begins and before which that unique being did not
exist. '22 Thus, "fertilization is a critical landmark."23 After the
point of syngamy, "the nuclei of the male and female gametes
17. See Forsythe, supra note 15, at 474.
18. Id. at 474.
19. Id. (citing GERALD TORTORA ET AL, MICROBIOLOGY. AN INTRODUCTION
190-226; CEDRIC I. DAvERN, INTRODUCTION TO READINGS FROM SCIENTIFIC AMERI-
CAN: GENETICS 2 (1982)).
20. Id. at 474.
21. See id. at 475.
22. Id. For further evidence as to why a zygote is a human being see id. at
477-80.
23. Id. at 476 (quoting RONAN O'RAHILLY & FABIOLA MULLER, HUMAN
EMBRYOLOGY & TERATOLOGY 29 (2d ed. 1996)).
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[begin to] unite resulting in the formation of a zygote... [which
has a] full complement of chromosomes [for a human]
nucleus." 24 Thus, once a zygote exists, the embryonic genome is
completely formed and embryonic development begins.25
When the one-celled zygote develops into other distinct
cells, the new cells are called blastomeres. 26 Blastomeres, early in
the process, have the potential to split off and become a second
embryo.27 As a zygote divides, the new cells become specialized 28
or they will not be able to divide to become new embryos.29 In
addition, the new cells, like the zygote, are somatic cells as
opposed to germ cells."
Based upon modern science, human cloning 1 could poten-
tially be accomplished using two separate techniques. One tech-
nique is to separate a blastomere from the zygote and is
commonly referred to as twinning.3 2 This type of cloning actu-
ally occurs naturally with the formation of identical twins3" and
now may occur artificially.34 The other technique is called
nuclear transfer or somatic cell nuclear transfer; this was the one
24. Id. at 475 (quoting WILLIAMJ. LARSEN, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY 1 (1993)).
25. Id. (quoting LARSEN, supra note 24, at 1 (1993)). Although the embry-
onic genome is complete, it is not activated until four to eight cells are present.
See O'RAHItLY & MULLER, supra note 23, at 29.
26. Forsythe, supra note 15, at 476. ("Because they divide mitotically, all
blastomeres contain identical chromosomes and genetic information as the
original one-celled zygote.") (citing 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 281 (Int'l ed.
1991)).
27. See O'RAHILLY & MULLER, supra note 23, at 33. When this occurs natu-
rally, identical twins develop.
28. They can specialize and become bone, hair, skin, ovum, sperm, or
other kinds of cells. See Forsythe, supra note 15, at 477. They may also be
referred to as differentiated. See, e.g., Melissa K. Cantrell, International Response
to Dolly: Will Scientific Freedom Get Sheared ?, 13 J.L. & HEALTH 69, 70 (1998-1999).
29. See Forsythe, supra note 15, at 477.
30. "A somatic cell is any cell of the embryo, fetus, child, or adult which
contains a full complement of two sets of chromosomes; in contrast with a germ
cell, i.e., an egg or a sperm, which contains only one set of chromosomes."
NBAC REPORT, supra note 8, at 1 n.2.
31. Human cloning should not be confused with gene cloning. Human
cloning seeks to make an entirely identical genetic entity whereas gene cloning
means replacing and replicating one specific gene. See Forsythe, supra note 15,
at 480-81 (citing JEFF LYON & PETER GORNER, ALTERED FATES: GENE THERAPY
AND THE RETOOLING OF HUMAN LIFE (1995); EvE K NICHOLs, NAT'L AcAD. OF
Sci., HUMAN GENE THERAPY (1988)).
32. See John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The
Legal Structure of New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 939, 951 (citing C. GROB-
STEIN, FROM CHANCE TO PURPOSE (1981)) [hereinafter Robertson].
33. NBAC REPORT, supra note 8, at 14.
34. SeeJohn A. Robertson, The Question of Human Cloning, HASTINGS CTR.
REP., Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 6 [hereinafter The Question].
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the Roslin Institute used.3 5 In this technique, scientists remove
the nucleus, and thus its twenty-three chromosomes, from an
ovum. Scientists also remove a nucleus from a somatic cell of the
person to be cloned.36 The somatic cell's nucleus, which has
forty-six chromosomes, is altered 37 and then placed into the enu-
cleated cell of the ovum.3" Thus, the ovum cell is tricked into
reacting as if the nucleus of a sperm cell had merged with its
ovum nucleus. The ovum is now fertilized and is re-implanted
into a womb to begin developing. 9 Both techniques for artificial
cloning are accomplished extracorporeally. 40
Human cloning, either somatic cell nuclear transfer or twin-
ning, could also be divided into two separate types, reproductive
and therapeutic. Reproductive cloning occurs for the explicit
purpose of creating or producing a human child.41 Therapeutic
cloning occurs to create an embryonic clone for research pur-
poses or for harvesting his or her cellular materials like stem
cells, bone marrow, or organs.42
II. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO HuMAN CLONING
After the Roslin Institute's announcement that they had suc-
cessfully cloned a mammal, the international community imme-
diately responded. The Vatican quickly suggested that countries
come together to pass a worldwide ban on human cloning.43
The Council of Europe adopted a parliamentary opinion on Sep-
tember 22, 1997, which called on the governments of the Coun-
35. See Cantrell, supra note 28, at 69-70.
36. See Forsythe, supra note 15, at 481.
37. One writer described the process for the cloned sheep as follows:
Dr. Wilmut's trick was to make the DNA of the differentiated donor
cell act like the DNA of a sperm or unfertilized egg. He and his team
.starved" the mammary cell into a dormant stage by reducing the
nutrient-laden serum to the cell, which made it capable of duplicating
the entire organism (like an undifferentiated cell). An electrical cur-
rent was then administered which caused the "starved" mammary cell
to fuse, in a process called renucleation, with an unfertilized egg from
which the nucleus had previously been removed through enucleation.
Cantrell, supra note 28, at 70.
38. Forsythe, supra note 15, at 481.
39. Id. at 482.
40. Id. (meaning outside the body).
41. See Francis Fukuyama, The House Was Right to Ban Cloning, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 2, 2001, at A14 (reporting that the U.S. House of Representative voted 265
to 162 to prohibit human cloning).
42. Id.
43. See Matthew M. Merrill, The Sheep Heard 'Round the World" Legislation
vs. Self-Regulation of Human Cloning, KAN.J.L. & PUB. PoL'V, Spring 1998, at 169,
182.
222 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17
cil to prohibit human cloning and suggested that the United
Nations adopt a similar worldwide ban." Specifically, the Coun-
cil recommended that each nation adopt legislation that "bans
any intervention seeking to create a human being genetically
identical to another human being, whether living or dead ...
and to provide for severe penal sanctions to deal with any viola-
tions."45 The Council reasoned that allowing a human to be
cloned into the same set of nuclear genetics was "contrary to
human dignity and thus constitutes a misuse of biology and
medicine."46 By January 12, 1998, nineteen members47 of the
Council signed this protocol.48 Since the Roslin Institute's
announcement in 1997, the issue of cloning has come to the
forefront as many countries, but not all, have either publicly con-
demned cloning,49 prohibited it, or limited it to therapeutic pro-
cedures.5 ° Despite the United State's appearance of joining the
Council in condemning human cloning," the Senate has yet to
pass a restriction on any human cloning procedure.52
44. Council of Europe: Draft Additional Protocol to the Convention on
Human Rights and Biomedicine on the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings
with Explanatory Report and Parliamentary Assembly Opinion, adopted Sept. 22,
1977, 36 I.L.M. 1415, 1422.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1417.
47. The countries who signed the protocol are Denmark, Estonia, Fin-
land, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Moldova,
Norway, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey.
SeeJoseph Schuman, European Countries Sign Ban On Human Cloning, ASSOCIATED
PRESs, Jan. 12, 1998.
48. John R. Schmertz & Mike Meier, Nineteen Council of Europe Members
Sign Protocol to Oviedo Convention on Bio-Ethics That Would Add Ban on Cloning of
Human Genes Set Except As to Isolated Cells or Tissue, 4 INT'L L. UPDATE 14, 14.
Germany did not sign the protocol claiming that its cloning prohibition was
stricter than the Council's protocol. Id. The United Kingdom did not sign the
protocol. Id.
49. See Jason T. Corsover, The Logical Next Step? An International Perspective
on the Issues of Human Cloning and Genetic Technology, 4 ILSAJ. INT'L & COMP. L.
697, 715-40 (1998) for a comprehensive overview of international responses to
genetic research and human cloning.
50. "[T]herapeutic cloning involves creating a clone of a patient by hol-
lowing out a donor egg and replacing it with a patient's cell. The resulting
embryo could be dissected to provide a source of stem cells that can be turned
into transplantable tissues to treat diseases." Antonio Regalado, Human Cloning
Attempt Is Opposed in Hearing, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2001, at B5.
51. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text; see also Schuman, supra
note 47 (citing how the United States is helping with the drafting of the Coun-
cil of Europe's prohibitory protocol).
52. See Regalado, supra note 50.
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III. FEDERAL PROPOSALS TO BAN HUMAN CLONING
& THE HCPA
In recent years, members of Congress have tried to pass leg-
islation to regulate private human cloning,5" but all of those
attempts prior to the HCPA have failed.54 Before the House of
Representatives passed the HCPA in 2001, at least twelve other
bills had been introduced in the 107th Congress to prevent
human cloning.55 The proposals that Congress entertained
varied substantially in some key areas and can be grouped into
two general categories, strict and permissive.56 The fundamental
policy difference between strict and permissive legislation is their
stance on whether the government should allow scientists to
clone humans into embryos.5 7 Strict bills forbid all human clon-
ing using the somatic cell nuclear transfer method,5" while per-
missive bills allow scientists to clone humans into embryos but
prohibit the scientists from implanting embryonic clones into
uteruses.59 In addition, only strict bills have attempted to enact
53. Multiple bills have been introduced to ban the use of federal funds to
further human cloning. This topic, however, will not be the subject of this
paper or part of my analysis. My Note will deal primarily with efforts to stop
human cloning by any person or entity, regardless of the source of funding.
54. See Fukuyama, supra note 41; S. 1601, 106th Cong. (1998); 144 CONG.
REc. S599-05 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1998) (The Senate failed to approve a motion
for cloture on the bill 42-54. The bill never made it out of committee after that
vote.); see also S. 1611, 105th Cong. (1998) (failing to carryover into the next
session after adjournment); S. 1599, 105th Cong. (1998) (failing to carryover);
S. 1574, 105th Cong. (1998) (failing to carryover); H.R. 923, 105th Cong.
(1997) (failing to carryover).
55. See S. 2439, 107th Cong. (2002); S. 2076, 107th Cong. (2002); S. 1899,
107th Cong. (2002); S. 1893, 107th Cong. (2002); S. 1758, 107th Cong. (2001);
H.R. 2608, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 2172, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 1644,
107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 1608, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 704, 107th Cong.
(2001); H.R. 1260, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 1601, 107th Cong. (2001).
56. The categories of "strict" and "permissive" may seem at first to corre-
spond respectively to supporters of bans on reproductive and therapeutic clon-
ing and supporters of just banning reproductive cloning, but that is not the
case. A supporter of only a ban on reproductive cloning may believe that a
permissive ban could not be adequately enforced unless a strict ban on all clon-
ing occurs. In addition, strict bans are also characterized by a strong effort to
criminalize cloning, whether therapeutic or reproductive.
57. Although the legislative difference appears to be over at what point
cloning should be prohibited from occurring, in actuality much of the debate is
between outlawing both reproductive and therapeutic cloning or just reproduc-
tive cloning. See Fukuyama, supra note 41.
58. See S. 1899, § 2(a) (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 301(1)); H.R. 1644, § 3(a);
S. 790, 107th Cong. § 3(a) (2001) (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 302(a)); H.R. 1608,
§ 3(a); S. 1601, § 3(a); S. 1599, § 3(a) (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 301(d)).
59. See S. 2439, § 4(a) (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 301(a)(1)) ("implanting or
attempting to implant . . . into a uterus or the functional equivalent of a
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prohibitions under Title 18, the "Crimes and Criminal Proce-
dure" section of the federal code.6" Most of these strict bills sanc-
tion a maximum of ten years in prison and various civil penalties
for those who violate them.6 1 The permissive proposals generally
mandated lesser sanctions than those imposed by the strict bills.
Some permissive bills do sanction criminal penalties for a viola-
tion,6 2 but they are more likely to contain only civil remedies or
fines that range from five thousand6 3 to ten million dollars.6 4
The permissive bills seem to be more conscientious about
protecting certain types of reproductive techniques and modes
of scientific exploration than about exhausting all measures to
prevent human cloning. In fact, House Bill 2172 and House Bill
2608, two permissive bills, exempt procedures that do not in any
way involve cloning.6 5 House Bill 1611, House Bill 2172, House
uterus"); S. 2076, § 2(1)(A)-(C) ("initiating or attempting to initiate a human
pregnancy; [or] . . . the implantation . . . into a mammalian uterus"); S. 1893,
§ 2 (proposed 42 U.S.C. § 498C(c)(1)) ("by implanting or attempting to
implant . . . into a woman's uterus or a substitute for a woman's uterus"); S.
1758, § 4 (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 301(a)(1)) ("by implanting or attempting to
implant.., into a uterus"); H.R. 2608, § 2 (proposed 21 U.S.C. § 100la(1) (A))
("with the intent to initiate a pregnancy"); H.R. 2172, § 2 (proposed 21 U.S.C.
§ 100la(1)(A)) ("with the intent to initiate a pregnancy"); S. 704,
§ 2(1) (A)-(C) ("initiating or attempting to initiate a human pregnancy; [or]
... the implantation . . . into a mammalian uterus"); H.R. 1260, § 2(a) ("with
the intent of implanting"); S. 1611, § 4 (proposed 42 U.S.C. § 289(b)(1)) ("to
implant or attempt to implant.., into a woman's uterus"); S. 1574, 105th Cong.
§ 3(c) (1997) ("for the purpose of, or to implant, the resulting product to initi-
ate a pregnancy . . ."); H.R. 923, § 2(a) (This statute is vague as to whether it
would allow implantation of a embryonic clone. In taking into account the
principle of lenity, however, the statute would likely be narrowly construed to
only prohibit implantation.).
60. S. 1899 § 2(a) (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1)); S. 790 § 3(a) (pro-
posed 18 U.S.C. § 302(a)); H.R. 1644 § 3(a); H.R. 1608 § 3(a); H.R 1601 § 3(a);
H.R. 1599 § 3(a) (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 301(d)).
61. S. 1899, § 2(a) (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 301 (c) (1)); S. 790 § 3(a) (pro-
posed 18 U.S.C. §302 (c)(1)); H.R. 1644 §3(a) (proposed 18 U.S.C.
§ 302(c) (1)); H.R. 1608 § 3(a) (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 1822(a)) (giving only a
maximum two-year sentence and not providing any civil penalties); S. 1601
§ 3(a) (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 301 (c) (1)); S. 1599 § 3(a) (proposed 18 U.S.C.
§ 301 (c) (1)).
62. S. 2439 § 4(a) (maximum ten-year sentence); S. 2076 § 4(b) (maxi-
mum ten-year sentence); S. 1893 § 2 (maximum ten-year sentence); H.R. 2608
§ 2(b) (maximum ten-year sentence); H.R. 2172 § 2(b) (ten-year sentence); S.
704 § 4(c) (maximum ten-year sentence); H.R. 1260 § 2(a) (maximum five-year
sentence).
63. See S. 1574 § 4(a); H.R. 923 § 2(b).
64. SeeS. 704 § 4(a).
65. Both H.R. 2608 and H.R. 2172 exempt "[t]he use of in vitro fertiliza-
tion, the administration of fertility-enhancing drugs, or the use of other medi-
cal procedures to assist a woman in becoming or remaining pregnant." H.R.
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Bill 2608, and Senate Bill 1758 have even tried to strike down all
state and local laws regarding cloning by attaching a broad pre-
emption clause. 66  Furthermore, those bills contain sunset
clauses, which would allow human cloning to become legal again
without any further legislative action.67 Although some federal
proposals to prohibit somatic cell nuclear transfer cloning are
more permissive than others, only two federal proposals-Senate
Bill 2076 and Senate Bill 704-would actually prohibit human
cloning using the twinning technique.
68
Despite these varying proposals, none have been able to gar-
ner the consent of an entire house of Congress. HCPA remains
the only proposal to pass one house, and to date it has yet to pass
the Senate. Thus, no federal law prohibiting private individuals
from cloning exists in the United States.69 The Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), though, has claimed that Congress has
given the FDA the authority to regulate human cloning. 7° For
the FDA to have such authority, however, the FDA would have to
deem human clones "drugs," which the Act defines as "articles
(other than food) intended to affect the structure of any func-
tion of the body."7' Experts have questioned the FDA's interpre-
tation, which at its heart treats clones as "articles. '72 Moreover,
because Congress has not given the FDA explicit and clear
2608 § 2(a) (proposed 21 U.S.C. § 1001 (b) (3)); H.R. 2172 § 2(a) (proposed 21
U.S.C. § 1001(b) (3)). Both bills along with H.R. 1611 also protect the use of
mitochondrial, cyoplasmic, or gene therapy. H.R. 2608 § 2(a) (proposed 21
U.S.C. § 1001 (b) (2)); H.R. 2172 § 2(a) (proposed 21 U.S.C. § 1001 (b) (2)); S.
1611 § 4(a) (proposed 42 U.S.C. § 498C(c) (2)).
66. "The provisions of this section shall preempt any State or local law
that prohibits or restricts research regarding, or practices constituting, somatic
cell nuclear transfer, mitochondrial or cytoplasmic therapy, or the cloning of
molecules, DNA, cells, tissues, organs, plants, animals, or humans." S. 1611 § 4
(proposed 42 U.S.C. § 498C(h)); see also S.1758 § 4(a) (proposed 18 U.S.C.
301(g)) (containing similar preemptive language). H.R. 2608 and H.R. 2172
have a similar preemption statement, but they contain a limited grandfather
clause of statutes enacted before the bill's enactment date. See H.R. 2172 § 2 (a)
(proposed 21 U.S.C. § 1001(d)); H.R. 2608 § 2(a) (proposed 21 U.S.C.
§ 1001 (d)).
67. H.R. 2608 § 2(a) (proposed 21 U.S.C. § 1001(e)) (ten-year sunset
clause); H.R. 2172 § 2(a) (proposed 21 U.S.C. § 1001(e)) (ten-year sunset
clause); S. 1611 § 4 (ten-year sunset clause).
68. S. 2076, § 2(1)(C); S. 704, § 2(1)(C). These bills, however, only pro-
hibit the implantation of embryonic clones and do not prohibit the twinning
technique to develop embryonic clones. Ethical concerns regarding this type of
legislation will be addressed infra in Part VIII(D).
69. See H.R. REP. 107-170, at 3 (2001).
70. See id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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authority and has attempted but failed to pass a ban on human
cloning, a court will probably hold that the FDA does not have
the authority to regulate human cloning, regardless of its own
statutory interpretations.7"
The push for the HCPA in the House of Representatives
developed largely from the national debate over whether federal
funds should be used to fund embryonic stem-cell research."4
Both the debates over human cloning and stem-cell research are
also closely linked to the highly volatile topic of abortion, as
one's perception of when life begins may influence what tech-
niques and types of cloning one believes should be outlawed and
how strict or permissive the law should be.75 Thus, many moral
and ethical issues surround the HCPA, and the proposal is based,
at least in part, upon some basic presuppositions, which will be
discussed in Part IV(A).
The HCPA's text and its legislative history describe its char-
acteristics. HCPA is a complete ban on human cloning using the
somatic cell nuclear transfer technique,76 as it seeks to outlaw
both reproductive and therapeutic cloning.77 Moreover, the
HCPA is inherently strict, and the bill would forbid human clon-
ing using the somatic cell nuclear transfer method at any stage.7v
In addition, the HCPA would be enforced under Title 18, and its
violators would be subject to sentences of up to ten years in
prison. 79 Furthermore, the Act contains civil penalties for viola-
tors who derive a pecuniary gain, including a minimum million-
dollar fine.8 ° The HCPA, however, does contain an exclusion
provision protecting some types of research, but the provision is
73. See Food and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120 (2000). The Supreme Court held that Congress had precluded the
FDA from regulating tobacco products, despite the FDA's construction of a stat-
ute that it administers claiming that it could regulate them. The Court instead
found that Congress had specifically spoken on the matter of tobacco regula-
tions through its past legislation and would not have delegated such broad
power to the FDA, which included the ability to ban all tobacco products, over a
policy decision of such a magnitude to an administrative agency.
74. Garvey, supra note 16.
75. Id.
76. See Brownstein & Zimer, supra note 4 and accompanying text.
77. Fukuyama, supra note 41.
78. See H.R. 2505, 107th Cong. § 2a (2001) (proposed 18 U.S.C.
§ 301(1)).
79. See id. (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1)).
80. See id. (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 302(c)(2)) ("a civil penalty of not less
than $1,000,000 and not more than an amount equal to the amount of the
gross gain multiplied by 2, if that amount is greater than $1,000,000").
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relatively limited."' Additionally, the HCPA neither preempts
state laws concerning cloning or research matters, nor contains a
sunset provision. The HCPA's legislative history reinforces these
characteristics as the House Subcommittee on Crime rejected
amendments to exclude therapeutic or research cloning from
the law, to protect certain types of reproductive techniques, to
include a five-year sunset provision, or to adopt language pre-
empting state cloning laws. 2 Thus, the key features of the HCPA
are not in dispute.
IV. A CRITIQUE OF THE HCPA & ITS
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY
As shown in Part III, the HCPA varies significantly from
other types of human cloning legislation. These variations occur
as a result of the HCPA's philosophical underpinnings and its
textual characteristics and scope. This section discusses the pur-
pose of the HCPA and analyzes its textual features. Moreover,
this section examines the legislation's constitutional authority,
which would enable its text to be enforced and its purpose to
come to fruition. Additionally, this section discusses the promi-
nent constitutional arguments that may be used to challenge
such legislation.
A. Philosophical Underpinnings
A fundamental premise underlying all proposed federal
human cloning bans is that reproductive cloning-cloning that
would produce a child-should be prohibited. 3 Proponents of
such a ban offer reasons ranging from claims that cloning proce-
dures are unsafe for women to claims that the act of human clon-
ing is inherently evil.8 4 The HCPA, along with other strict
cloning prohibitions, hold to another underlying premise-no
one should clone a human, even for therapeutic or research pur-
81. "Nothing in this section restricts areas of scientific research not specif-
ically prohibited by this section, including research in the use of nuclear trans-
fer of other cloning techniques to produce molecules, DNA, cells other than
human embryos, tissues, organs, plants, or animals other than humans." Id.
(proposed 18 U.S.C. § 302(d)).
82. See H.R. REP. 107-170, at 6-7 (2001),
83. Fukuyama, supra note 41.
84. See NBAC REPORT, supra note 8, at 64 (arguing that the significant
risks to the unborn and the physical well-being of the child requires that the
procedure be prohibited); Lisa Zagaroli, Ban Cloning Funding, Research, Ehlers
Says, DET. NEWS, Mar. 6, 1997, at A5 (quoting Rep. Vern Ehlers as saying that
"[iut is simply wrong to experiment with the creation of human life in this
way").
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poses. Proponents justify such legislation by using arguments
anywhere from "embryonic research is inherently wrong" 5 to "a
total ban is the only effective means available to prevent repro-
ductive cloning." 6 Thus, although the premises of the statute
are apparent enough to produce a somewhat effective ban,
policymakers should still seek a consensus as to the theories
behind the premises in order to develop additional, coherent
policies against human cloning.87
85. See generally Phil Belin, A Pro-life Primer on Embryonic Stem Cell Research
(Aug. 2001) (on file with author) (discussing how life begins at conception and
before implantation, which means that research that causes undue harm or
death to an embryo is unacceptable).
86. See Prohibition on Human Cloning: Prepared Witness Testimony on H.R.
1644, Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001, and H.R. 2172, Cloning Prohibition
Act of 2001 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the House Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Leon Kass, M.D., Ph.D., Addie Clark
Harding Professor of Social Thought, University of Chicago) [hereinafter Kass
Testimony] (discussing how once one of the existing embryonic clones that was
developed for research purposes only is implanted no one will be able to legally
stop the clone from being born, except the woman carrying him or her).
87. For instance, the theories of criminal law that Congress wishes to use
to implement such a policy make a significant impact on its interpretation and
effectiveness. The three most recognized theories behind criminal law are retri-
bution, deterrence, and rehabilitation. The theory of retribution states that
"someone who has violated the rights of others should be penalized, and pun-
ishment restores the moral order that has been breached by the original wrong-
ful act." 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1338 (Sanford H. Kadish ed.,
1983) [hereinafter "4 ENCYCLOPEDIA"]. The theory of deterrence, though,
claims that punishment of offenders occurs to create a threat of punishment
that will discourage the offenders and society from committing such offenses.
See id. at 1686. Retribution focuses on attempting to reform an offender by
reducing or eliminating his "subsequent criminal behavior through a program
of planned intervention." Id. at 1364. Because the three theories differ in their
approaches to punishment, when they are all applied to a similar situation the
outcomes may be different. Consequently, if Congress agrees that therapeutic
and reproductive cloning are both not inherently evil, the laws would be malum
prohibitum regulations. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 296 (Sanford H.
Kadish ed., 1983) (Mala prohibita acts are wrong simply because they are prohib-
ited.) [hereinafter "1 ENCYCLOPEDIA"]. This situation would likely mean that
the statute should be interpreted and construed to only deter a person from
cloning and that if a person did clone a human, the person should only be
punished if the punishment was consistent with the deterrence principles. If
human cloning was malum in se, however, a clonist would be punished regard-
less if the punishment would deter others from cloning or deter her from clon-
ing again. Thus, because multiple combinations of theories exist, the bill could
be construed or reformed in vastly different ways to become more effective in
light of its underlying theories. I argue and then assume that the HCPA was
passed on the theory that both therapeutic and reproductive cloning-either
by their ultimate results or their procedures-are malum in se and that what the
House intended to impose was both a theory of retribution and deterrence in
enforcing this legislation.
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In examining the text and the legislative history of the
HCPA, several key aspects point to the House's understanding
that reproductive and therapeutic cloning are inherently unethi-
cal. The legislative history plainly states that somatic cell nuclear
cloning is an "ethically and morally objectionable procedure."88
Additionally, the Act "specifies that the mental culpability stan-
dard for violating the criminal statute is 'knowingly."' 89 This
state of mind requirement, which was specifically noted in com-
mittee,90 appears to cast the bill as a malum in se offense and not
as a mere morally neutral regulation.9 ' Furthermore, the HCPA
prohibits someone to "knowingly .. .receive for any purpose an
embryo produced by human cloning or any product derived
from such embryo." 2 The mere fact that simply receiving the
byproduct of human cloning is strongly prohibited shows that
the act of cloning itself must be intolerable or reprehensible.
Moreover, the fact that human cloning is prohibited "for any
purpose" indicates how severe and repugnant the House per-
ceived cloning to be. In addition, H.R. 2505 also criminalizes
attempts to perform a human cloning procedure or to partici-
pate in an attempt," which further indicates that Congress
believes that human cloning is malum in se. 4 Therefore, because
both the legislative history and the text indicate that the House
believed cloning to be morally objectionable, lawmakers
intended to use the HCPA to punish and prevent a moral wrong.
In fact, because the text prohibits and indiscriminately punishes
both therapeutic and reproductive cloning, the most probable
message that the House wished to convey was that both types of
88. H.R. REP. 107-170, at 3 (2001); But see id. ("[T]he sections on Con-
gressional findings and the sense of Congress contained in H.R. 1644 are not
included in H.R. 2505.). The findings in H.R. 1644 included § 2(7), which
stated "the prospect of creating new human life solely to be exploited and
destroyed in this way has been condemned on moral grounds by many[.]"
89. H.R. REP. 107-170, at 4.
90. See id.; see also Cloning Prohibition Body Armor Restrictions: Hearings on
Human Cloning H.R 1644 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Gerald V. Bradley, Professor of Law,
University of Notre Dame) [hereinafter Bradley Testimony].
91. See 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 87, at 299-300 (describing how acts
associated with crimes that contain a lower level of mens rea are sometimes not
considered to be moral wrongs in and of themselves).
92. H.R. 2505, 107th Cong. § 2a (2001) (proposed 18 U.S.C.
§ 302(a) (3)) (emphasis added).
93. See id. (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 302(a)(1)-(2)).
94. The fact that Congress wishes either to severely deter the procedure
or to punish that actor not only for a completed result but an intention, along
with the overt act, to complete the result conveys the message that the proce-
dure, including the intention to perform it, is objectionable.
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cloning were morally objectionable. Consequently, the House
likely adopted the position that "the prospect of creating new
human life solely to be exploited and destroyed" is morally
problematic.95
B. Textual Analysis
An understanding of the prominent textual issues is neces-
sary in evaluating any statute, including the HCPA.96 Although
textual issues may be numerous at times, the main issues involv-
ing the HCPA are its ambiguous scientific language, its state of
mind requirement, and the ability of prosecutors to enforce such
legislation.
95. H.R. 1644, 107th Cong. § 2(7). This bill was the statutory precursor
to the HCPA. The HCPA was identical with the exception of a few changes in
committee and without H.R. 1644's findings. See H.R. REP. 107-170, at 3.
96. The chargeable portions of the test are as follows:
Sec. 301. Definitions
In this chapter:
(1) HUMAN CLONING- The term 'human cloning' means
human asexual reproduction, accomplished by introducing
nuclear material from one or more human somatic cells into
a fertilized or unfertilized oocyte whose nuclear material has
been removed or inactivated so as to produce a living organ-
ism (at any stage of development) that is genetically virtually
identical to an existing or previously existing human
organism.
(2) ASEXUAL REPRODUCTION- The term 'asexual reproduc-
tion' means reproduction not initiated by the union of
oocyte and sperm.
(3) SOMATIC CELL- The term 'somatic cell' means a diploid
cell (having a complete set of chromosomes) obtained or
derived from a living or deceased human body at any stage of
development.
Sec. 302. Prohibition on human cloning
(a) IN GENERAL- It shall be unlawful for any person or entity,
public or private, in or affecting interstate commerce, know-
ingly-
(1) to perform or attempt to perform human cloning;
(2) to participate in an attempt to perform human cloning;
or
(3) to ship or receive for any purpose an embryo produced
by human cloning or any product derived from such
embryo.
(b) IMPORTATION- It shall be unlawful for any person or entity,
public or private, knowingly to import for any purpose an
embryo produced by human cloning, or any product derived
from such embryo.
H.R. 2505 § 2(a) (proposed 18 U.S.C. §§ 301-02).
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1. Restrictive Scientific Language
Because language is by nature inadequate to convey a full
and complete understanding of one's thoughts, statutory texts
are prone to being incomplete and misunderstood, miscon-
strued, or misapplied. Although these concerns exist in the typi-
cal statute, they are heightened in those, like the HCPA, that
must describe a scientific procedure. The HCPA's goal was to
eliminate the possibility of cloning in the United States but to
not restrict valid and morally permissible scientific procedures.9 7
"Extremely carefully drafted and limited to its scope, the bill
makes very clear that there is to be no interference with the sci-
entific and medical practices [that are not morally objectiona-
ble]. '"8 The exact wording in barring somatic cell nuclear
transfers, however, may be too rigid to constitute an effective ban
on human cloning.
The statute defines human cloning very specifically in ways
that may prove problematic. The HCPA states that "[t]he term
'human cloning' means human asexual reproduction, accom-
plished by introducing nuclear materials from one or more
human somatic cells. ... " The word "mean" is exclusionary,
100
and therefore, if a scientist develops a similar method that is dis-
tinguishable from the definition of "human cloning" the Act
would not apply. With the dynamics and growth of the biotech
industry, this restrictive approach would protect some non-mor-
ally objectionable techniques but may not effectively prohibit
human cloning. Furthermore, the HCPA only prohibits somatic
cell nuclear transfers that "produce a living organism (at any
stage of development) that is genetically virtually identical to
[another human organism] ."" The phrase "genetically virtually
identical" is not defined in the text, and therefore, if a court lib-
erally construes the phrase, a scientist who has cloned a human
97. See Kass Testimony, supra note 86 ("[The bill is] precisely suited to
accomplish this goal [of stopping human cloning], no more and no less.").
98. Id. This claim is disputed, however, as critics cite multiple procedures
that this bill inadvertently bans. See H.R. RP. 107-170, at 73, 80 (claiming that
the bill is overbroad and would ban stem-cell research, ooplasmic transfers, and
mitochondria introductions).
99. H.R. 2505 § 2(a) (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 301 (1)) (emphasis added).
100. "'Mean' is the most common and general in carrying the basic sense
although it can often connote evaluation or appraisal; in applying to a term it
involves the term's full content." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL Dic-
TIONARY 1398 (1986).
101. H.R. 2505 § 2(a) (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 301 (1)) (emphasis added).
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but made a few genetic alternations may escape prosecution.0 2
Therefore, although the definitions are narrowly defined, the
effectiveness of the law, in light of new advancements in technol-
ogy, may be minimal at best.
2. State of Mind
Criminal statutes that do not include a state of mind require-
ment are disfavored, 1°3 and the nature of this offense and its ten-
year sentence suggests that a state of mind other than strict liabil-
ity, like recklessly or knowingly, be implied in the statute.1 °4
Therefore, the drafters of the HCPA inserted a state of mind of
"knowingly" for the conduct needed to violate the statute in sec-
tions 302 (a) (1)-(a) (3) and (b). 05 Nevertheless, several contex-
tual ambiguities exist concerning exactly what an actor must
know to violate the statute. For instance, the courts will likely
interpret the requirement that the violation take place "in or
affecting interstate commerce" to be ajurisdictional hook. Thus,
the courts will likely imply strict liability to that element' 0 6
In Section 302(a), the statute states, "it shall be unlawful for
any person . . . knowingly . . to perform human cloning ... to
participate in an attempt to perform human cloning.' °7 The
question arises, however, concerning what level of knowledge
"knowingly" requires as to the "human cloning," which the stat-
ute defines in Section 301(1)." °s If the actor must fully know
that human cloning, as defined, would take place, participants
who may not have a scientific background but who knew they
were participating in a least a general type of cloning could not
be guilty of violating the statute. But, if a participant need only
102. The phrase "genetically virtually identical" has also been criticized as
possibly outlawing practices that Congress did not intend to outlaw, such as the
introduction of mitochondria into a fertilized egg. See H.R. RE. 107-170, at 80.
103. See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437-38 (1978).
104. See Bradley Testimony, supra note 90.
105. H.R. 2505 § 2(a) (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 302(a)-(b)).
106. See United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 68 (1984) ("[Jurisdictional
hook's] primary purpose is to identify the factor that makes the [offense] an
appropriate subject for federal concern. Jurisdictional language need not con-
tain the same culpability requirement as other elements of the offense.")
107. H.R. 2505 § 2(a) (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 302(a)).
108. Id. (proposed 18 U.S.C. §§ 301-02).
The term 'human cloning' means human asexual reproduction,
accomplished by introducing nuclear material from one or more
human somatic cells into a fertilized or unfertilized oocyte whose
nuclear material has been removed or inactivated so as to produce a
living organism (at any stage of development) that is genetically virtu-
ally identical to an existing or previously existing human organism.
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know that a general type of cloning is to occur, the statute would
be more effective in deterring human cloning but would also
likely deter participation in cloning techniques that fall outside
the statute.
In general, "knowingly" would probably be construed to
mean full knowledge of the human cloning as defined in the stat-
ute. In interpreting the statute, the principle of lenity dictates
that the statute be construed in favor of the defendant,1 °9 which
would result in a "full knowledge" interpretation. The govern-
ment may argue, however, that because human cloning is unu-
sual and morally wrong, such exact knowledge should not be
required, but rather only general knowledge should be required.
A court, however, will likely hold that knowledge as to the sur-
rounding circumstances is required. 1 0°
Section 302 (a) (3) also states that it is unlawful for a person
"knowingly ... to ship or receive ... an embyo produced by human
cloning." "' Section 302(b) states a similar requirement that it is
unlawful for a person "knowingly to import.., an embryo produced
by human cloning. 2 Thus, on its face, the statute may seem
unclear whether it requires that the actor know that the embryo
was produced by human cloning or whether she knew that the
thing she knowingly possessed was an embryo. When a statute is
silent, however, the government must show that the defendant
possessed knowledge as to the surrounding circumstances that
bear on liability.' 1 3 Therefore, a court will likely find that the
actor needed to have known that the actor possessed a human
embryonic clone. For the same reason, a court may find that the
actor needs knowledge that the embryo was produced through
somatic cell nuclear transfer human cloning. Nevertheless, a
court could reasonably find "in view some category of dangerous
and deleterious devices" that the law could assume that the indi-
vidual was alerted to the fact that he stood in "responsible rela-
tion to a public danger."' 14 In addition, a court could rule that
simply importing, shipping, or receiving embryos in and of itself
is an act that "one would hardly be surprised to learn ... is not
109. See, e.g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985) (apply-
ing the rule of lenity to an ambiguity in favor of the defendant, which resulted
in the reversal of the defendant's conviction).
110. See, e.g., United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
111. H.R. 2505 § 2(a) (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 302 (a)(3)) (emphasis
added).
112. Id. (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 302 (b)) (emphasis added).
113. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
114. Id. at 612 (quoting United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281
(1943)).
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an innocent act."1 5 In all likelihood, a court will find that
knowledge that the embryo is a human clone is needed because
of the principle of lenity and because importing, shipping, and
receiving embryos in and of itself is not generally considered to
be morally objectionable.
3. Prosecutorial Discretion
The United States Congress has created approximately 3,300
criminal laws in Tide 18 in an attempt to establish national poli-
cies concerning various types of actions and behaviors."' 6 The
responsibility to implement these policies, however, rests solely
on the Executive Branch and more specifically, the Department
of Justice. Thus, the effectiveness of a law depends largely on its
ease of enforceability and prosecutorial initiative. Relative to
other proposals, the HCPA is generally enforceable.117 The sci-
entific definition, though, may pose an enforceability problem as
technology increases causing procedures to escape the scope of
the statute."' Furthermore, how a court interprets the Act's men
rea requirement will affect a prosecutor's ability to convict those
who clone humans."' As the courts require more mens rea to
violate a statute, the statute becomes more difficult to enforce.
Moreover, if the courts continue to apply rules of construction in
favor of those who clone, they will limit the statute's scope and its
effectiveness.
Prosecutorial initiative will also dictate the legislation's effec-
tiveness. For instance, if prosecutors are interested, committed,
and supportive of the HCPA's attempt to ban all human cloning,
the HCPA is more likely to be enforced. 20 Moreover, if local law
115. United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971) (holding that know-
ingly possessing hand grenades satisfies the mental culpability requirement for
a statute forbidding the possession of unregistered grenades because grenades
are so dangerous to the public safety that one has fair notice that they may need
to be registered); see also United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922) (holding
that knowing that the drug possessed is prohibited is not required because the
act of possessing drugs is so dangerous that the possessor has already been put
on fair notice that the types of drugs he possesses may be regulated).
116. See Ronald L. Gainer, Federal Criminal Code Reform: Past and Future, 2
Buiw. CRIM. L. REv. 45, 53 (1998).
117. See Bradley Testimony, supra note 90.
118. See supra notes 97-102 (discussing the difficulty with the HCPA's sci-
entific language).
119. See supra notes 103-15 and accompanying texts for a discussion on
textual ambiguities involving state of mind.
120. See Timothy S. Bynum, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Implementation of
a Legislative Mandate, in IMPLEMENTING CRIMINAL JUSTICE PoLICIEs 47 (Merry
Morash ed., 1982) (citing M. McLaughlin, Implementation as Mutual Adaption, in
SOCIAL PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION 167-80 (W. Williams & R. Elmore eds.,
2003] A COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL POLICY TO STOP HUMAN CLONING 235
enforcement officials perceive the policies and their purpose to
be clear, stricter enforcement is more likely.12' Additionally,
prosecutors face environmental pressures from those within the
legal community and from political constituencies that may
shape prosecutorial policies and decisions, which could alter its
effectiveness. 122 Furthermore, the prosecutorial structure is such
that even if committed prosecutors have a clear statute with no
pressing negative environmental pressures "there may [be] a
great deal of variation in the manner in which [cloning policies]
are carried out. ' 123 In addition, neither Congress nor the courts
have power to compel a prosecution, 124 and the prosecutor's
decision to bring a charge cannot be second-guessed.' 25 Thus,
unless the United States Attorney General makes a concerted
effort to mandate strict enforcement of the HCPA, its effective-
ness toward prohibiting all cloning is in jeopardy. But, because
the HCPA does not preempt state and local laws on cloning, state
prosecutors may still have the ability to prohibit cloning if federal
prosecutors prove unreliable.'26 Consequently, prosecutorial dis-
cretion may threaten the HCPA's effectiveness, but the legisla-
tion would serve as a good first step towards a national policy
against human cloning.
C. Constitutional Authority Under the Commerce Clause
The HCPA cites Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United
States Constitution, the Commerce Clause, as Congress' sole
1976); D. Van Meter & C. Van Horn, The Policy Implementation Process: A Concep-
tual Framework, 6 ADMIN. & Soc'y 445-88 (1975)).
121. See id. at 47 (citing BERYL RADIN, IMPLEMENTATION, CHANGE, AND THE
FEDERAL BUREAUCRACy (1978)).
122. See id. (citing L. Mellon, J. Jacoby & M. Brewer, The Prosecutor Con-
strained by His Environment: A New Look at Discretionary Justice in the United States,
72J. CRuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 52, 52-81 (1981)). Although federal prosecutors
are more insulated from some pressures than state prosecutors because they are
not elected, they ultimately must answer to the Chief Executive, the President,
who is elected.
123. See id. at 48.
124. See G. Robert Blakey, Federal Criminal Law: The Need, Not for Revised
Constitutional Theory or New Congressional Statutes, But the Exercise of Responsible
Prosecutive Discretion, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1175, 1216 n.91 (1995) (citing United
States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 170-72 (5th Cir. 1965)).
125. See id. (citing Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480-82 (D.C.
Cir. 1967)).
126. Nevertheless, because state prosecutors are generally limited to only
enforcing state criminal laws and because the HCPA does not extend
prosecutorial authority to state prosecutors, a state anti-cloning statute would
first have to be enacted to enable state prosecutors to enforce a cloning ban.
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authority to enact such legislation,1 27 which states that Congress
has the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."'12 In
Champion v. Ames, the Court interpreted this power to allow Con-
gress to prohibit items in commerce from traveling across state
lines.129 The Court, in United States v. Green, upheld Congress'
ability to protect interstate commerce from injury.'30 Thus,
because other acts have outlawed criminal actions that interfered
with commerce "in any way or degree,"' 3 ' Congress' power to
criminalize acts in or affecting commerce has generally been
considered broad. In addition to the broad power, the Court
found in Perez v. United States'12 that Congress could find, as a
matter of law, whether a class of activities affects interstate com-
merce, thus alleviating a federal prosecutor's duty to prove that a
class of alleged activities actually affected interstate commerce.
133
On its face, the HCPA appears to meet this standard as the stat-
ute applies to cloning that occurs "in or affecting interstate
commerce."1
34
The Court, however, appeared to shift its Commerce Clause
jurisprudence in United States v. Lopez. 135 The Court stated that
valid Commerce Clause legislation should be grouped into three
categories:
127. See H.R. REP. 107-170, at 10 (2001).
128. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
129. 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
[L]ottery tickets are subjects of traffic among those who choose to sell
or buy them; that the carriage of such tickets by independent carriers
from one state to another is therefore interstate commerce; that
under its power to regulate commerce among the several states Con-
gress-subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution upon
the exercise of the powers granted-has plenary authority over such
commerce, and may prohibit the carriage of such tickets from state to
state
Id. at 363; see also Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (upholding the
Mann Act as constitutional, which outlawed the transporting of women in inter-
state commerce for the purposes of prostitution).
130. 350 U.S. 415, 420-21 (upholding the Hobbs Act and stating that the
legislation was aimed at protecting interstate commerce from extortion and
that "racketeering affecting interstate commerce was within federal legislative
control" (citation omitted)); see Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215
(1960) for a more explicit explanation of the Hobbs Act's constitutional
authority.
131. See Stirone, 361 U.S. at 215 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (a)).
132. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
133. See id. at 151-52.
134. H.R. 2505, 107th Cong. § 2a (2001) (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 302(a)).
135. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of
interstate commerce.... Second, Congress is empowered
to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce,
even though the threat may come only from intrastate
activities. . . . Finally, Congress' commerce authority
includes the power to regulate those activities having a sub-
stantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce.13 6
Furthermore, the Court also held that if the congressional regu-
lations could only be upheld under the substantial relationship
category, the regulated activities must also be economic for the
regulation to be sustained. 1 7 Moreover, the Court suggested
that states "possess primary authority for defining and enforcing
the criminal law." 3' In addition, the Court in United States v.
Morrison, struck down another statute in a similar fashion even
though Congress had numerous findings as to the prohibited
activities' effect on interstate commerce. 13 9 Therefore, in light of
the Court's recent shift in jurisprudence, the HCPA's constitu-
tional authority under the Commerce Clause may be less
sound.' 40
Congress would undoubtedly have the authority to prohibit
all cloning activities that involved the channels of interstate com-
merce. 141 Thus, anyone who crossed state lines to perform,
attempt to perform, or participate in an attempt to perform a
proscribed human cloning procedure would be held liable under
this statute. Furthermore, any person shipping goods over state
lines or receiving or importing a good from across state lines
could also be liable under the HCPA. Congress also has the
136. Id. at 558-59 (citations omitted).
137. Id. at 560 ("Where economic activity substantially affects interstate
commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.").
138. Id. at 561 n.3 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635
(1993)). The Court also identifies other areas of state sovereignty like family
law, see id. at 564, and education, see id. at 566.
139. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
140. The courts could interpret the HCPA's jurisdictional phrase "in or
affecting interstate commerce" either to establish an element of the crime to
which the government would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt or to be
a flat ban on human cloning through Congress' exercising their plenary com-
merce power. See Bradley Testimony, supra note 90. If a court should doubt
that Congress has the power to completely ban human cloning under the Com-
merce Clause, the court would likely construe the statute's jurisdictional phrase
to establish an element of the crime. See id. Thus, this paper will proceed on
the basis that the HCPA's jurisdictional phrase is an element that must be
proven.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 135-36.
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power to regulate interstate instrumentalities and to protect
items in interstate commerce. 142 Therefore, if the government
proved that a person used a plane, train, car, or another instru-
ment of interstate commerce while engaging in, or attempting to
engage in, an act prohibited under the statute, proper jurisdic-
tion would be established to hold the actor liable under the
HCPA. 43 If the alleged perpetrator failed to involve an inter-
state channel or use an interstate instrumentality, however, the
court would have to find that his or her activities were economic
and had or would have had a "substantial effect" on interstate
commerce. 144
Typically, the Court would look at whether the class of activi-
ties in the aggregate would have a substantial affect on com-
merce. 145 The Court has recently scrutinized such activities,
however, and has been hesitant to apply the aggregation princi-
ple.146 Furthermore, because human cloning should not be con-
sidered an economic activity, 1 47 the Court may not look favorably
upon the HCPA, especially considering that the Act criminalizes
cloning activities on the federal level. Moreover, the Act con-
tains no congressional findings that show that human cloning
would substantially affect commerce. However, one could rea-
sonably foresee how human cloning, especially in the hands of a
major biotech industry, could have a substantial impact on com-
142. See supra text accompanying note 136.
143. Congress, or a federal prosecutor, may argue that an embryonic
clone is a part of interstate commerce. Nevertheless, deeming a clone to be
commerce or allowing clones to be bought and sold raises some serious ethical
questions, not the least of which is whether such activity would treat humans as
buyable and sellable objects. Thus, such arguments should not be furthered
and courts should not accept them until these questions have been addressed,
regardless of a case's potential outcome.
144. See infra text accompanying note 148.
145. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (looking to the
class of activities and not an individual act to see whether commerce was sub-
stantially affected).
146. See Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159,
173 (2001) (striking down regulations attempting to preserve migratory birds
because they exceed Congress' authority under the Commerce clause despite
the finding by the Court of Appeals that "millions of people spend over a bil-
lion dollars annually on recreational pursuits relating to migratory birds").
147. See infra notes 162-68 and Part VIII(C). Although some may claim
that human cloning research performed by private companies for commercial
interests is inherently economic, that view fails to consider the broader perspec-
tive that what actually is occurring is the creation and use of a human being. In
addition, the procreative process, either through surrogate motherhood or in
vitro fertilization procedures, should not be deemed predominately economic.
Deeming these actions as commercial or economic would not only degrade
human dignity but would likely lead to numerous public policy dilemmas.
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merce and a national economy. In addition, some uses for clon-
ing, whether ethical or otherwise, may be largely commercial.
Nevertheless, a court would likely find that some instances exist
where cloning is not commercial. Therefore, a court would
probably construe the statute to apply only in instances where
cloning is performed for economic gain.
Regardless, with the complicated procedures involved in the
cloning process, the likelihood of some communication, equip-
ment, or personnel that must either appear in an interstate chan-
nel or use an interstate instrumentality is great. Moreover, most
clonists and their supporting organizations have monetary moti-
vations, and thus their actions would probably be considered
commercial in nature. Therefore, the HCPA would likely be
effective in prohibiting human cloning in most instances and be
held constitutional.
148
D. Constitutional Challenges
1. Procreative Rights
In Skinner v. Oklahoma,149 the United States Supreme Court
alluded that the Constitution protected a fundamental right to
marry and to procreate. The Court has expanded upon the right
to marry;150 however, the right to procreate remains largely a
mystery. Advocates of cloning argue that a right to clone a
human is encompassed within the right to procreate.
Nevertheless, if the Court did recognize a right to clone, the
Court would not be recognizing the "right to procreate" as
defined by the facts of Skinner. In Skinner, the Court invalidated
an act that allowed certain criminals to be sterilized. 51 Thus,
any "right to procreate" found in Skinner would mean the right
not to be affirmatively deprived of one's natural abilities that, if
exercised within conical a act of sex, could cause conception, a
definition that is also in accordance with traditional notions of
procreation throughout American history. Therefore, the Court
would either have to expand the "right to procreate" or establish
a "right to clone" to hold the HCPA unconstitutional.
148. See Bradley Testimony, supra note 90.
149. 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (invalidating an act under the Equal Protection
Clause that compelled the sterilization of criminals after their third conviction
of crimes involving "moral turpitude").
150. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (invaliding restrictions
that required a court to give permission for an adult to marry); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to marital privacy involving
contraception).
151. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
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The Supreme Court restated its test for recognizing substan-
tive due process rights in Washington v. Glucksberg.1 52 In rejecting
the notion that a person has a substantive due process right to
commit suicide, the Court in Glucksberg stated,
Our established method of substantive-due-process analysis
has two primary features: First, we have regularly observed
that the Due Process Clause specially protects those funda-
mental rights and liberties which are, objectively, "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," . . . and
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," . . . such that
"neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacri-
ficed,".... Second, we have required in substantive-due-
process cases a "careful description" of the asserted funda-
mental liberty interest.... Our Nation's history, legal tra-
ditions, and practices thus provide the crucial "guideposts
for responsible decisionmaking," . . . that direct and
restrain our exposition of the Due Process Clause. 153
Because human cloning is an extremely recent develop-
ment, the Court would likely not find that a person had a funda-
mental right to clone a human. The Court has not even taken
the intermediate step of finding that married couples that strug-
gle to naturally create a child have a fundamental right to an in
vitro fertilization procedure.
Moreover, any such expansion for cloning or in vitro fertili-
zation would in effect be recognizing a right "to create a child"
or a right "to a child." Such a right would not only run afoul of
American tradition but would treat children as property to be
created to fulfill their parents' desires, interests, and wants.
Although the wanting of a child is one of the deepest desires a
couple may have,15 4 the act of parenting is not about the parents'
desire but the child's needs. At a time when public policies need
not reinforce the myth that raising a family is all about the par-
ents, the Court would not likely constitutionalize such a policy by
effectively recognizing a "right to a child."
Pro-cloners have also argued that a fundamental "right to
clone" or a fundamental "right to harm an embryonic human,
whether a clone or not, for researching toward an admirable
goal" rests in the penumbra of the woman's "right to an abor-
tion. "155 However, Roe v. Wade15 6 and Planned Parenthood v.
152. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
153. Id. at 711-12 (citations omitted).
154. See Robertson, supra note 32, at 942.
155. See Debra L. Moore, Don't Rush to Judgment on "Dolly ": Human Cloning
and its Individual Procreative Liberty Implications, 66 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 425, 433-35
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Casey 1 57 are not applicable in the cloning debate, as banning
cloning or embryonic research does not affect a women's right to
terminate her pregnancy, to maintain bodily integrity, to make
autonomous decisions, or to avoid physical or emotional
harm. 15' Thus, the harms the plurality opinion in Casey used to
justify sustaining Roe are not present when a woman seeks to
become pregnant with a clone. 159 Therefore, no basis exists to
extend the reproductive rights announced in Roe or Casey to
human cloning or even in vitro fertilization for that matter.
2. Research Rights
Some academics have attempted to take advantage of the
Supreme Court's libertarian First Amendment jurisprudence by
claiming that a ban on human cloning will restrict scientists' free
speech rights, academic freedoms, and their search for knowl-
edge and truth. Indeed, the First Amendment does protect
expressive conduct, 6 ' and some claim that the First Amendment
protects the "marketplace of ideas" to advance knowledge and
(1997) (presenting the argument that the right to clone could be found to be a
fundamental right under the Supreme Court's substantive due process doctrine
if the right is broadly defined as a "right to non-coital reproduction," which may
be held to be a fundamental right if broadly defined as a "right to procreate,"
which has its basis the "right to privacy"); seeJune Coleman, Playing God or Play-
ing Scientist: A Constitutional Analysis of State Laws Banning Embryological Proce-
dures, 27 PAC. L.J. 1331 (1996).
Many parents might feel uneasy being involved in a process that cre-
ates the potential for life merely to have the excess embryos destroyed
without being used for a higher purpose .... Thus, denying these
parents an option [that does not merely destroy them for no benefit,]
such as donation for embryological research, would seriously affect
and limit their reproductive choices.
Id. at 1379.
156. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
157. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
158. See Forsythe, supra note 15, at 517-25.
159. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 852 (plurality opinion). The Casey Court out-
lined those harms, stating,
The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to
physical constraints, to pain that only she must bear.... Her suffering
is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without more, upon
its own vision of the woman's role, however dominant that vision has
been in the course of our history and our culture. The destiny of the
woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of
her spiritual imperatives and her place in society.
Id.
160. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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discover truth. 6 ' Nevertheless, the First Amendment does not
allow someone to use any means necessary to gain knowledge,
nor does it protect every avenue that may be used to obtain truth.
Furthermore, the claims of academic freedom deal mainly with
content-based restrictions and not content-neutral restrictions on
conduct. 6 2 Moreover, a scientist's illegal experimentation does
not convey an apparent message concerning cloning other than
defying the government's laws, 6 ' which if accepted as the appli-
cable First Amendment test would nullify all laws.' 6 4 As the
Court stated in O'Brien, it will not "accept the view that an appar-
ently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' when-
ever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to
express an idea."
1 65
3. Humans as Commerce
Because the HCPA attempts to ban human cloning through
the Commerce Clause, one could challenge Congress' authority
to pass such a statute because the legislation would treat humans
and their creation as economic or commercial.' 6 6 As previously
discussed in Part IV(C), Congress' Commerce Power allows it to
regulate three areas of commerce, but the only issue here would
be under the "substantial relation" test which would treat the cre-
ation of embryos as "in or affecting commerce."' 6 7 Human life
161. Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
YALE L.J. 877, 878-87 (1963), reprinted inJOHN H. GARVEY & FREDERICK SCHAUER,
THE FiRsT AMENDMENT: A READER 50-51 (2d ed. 1996).
162. Pro-cloners claim that Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959),
and Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957), are foundations for academic
freedom to clone. These cases focused on inquiries into political affiliation,
however, and not a content-neutral restriction on conduct. Moreover, "[a]n
educational institution is not a constitutional sanctuary from inquiry into mat-
ters that may otherwise be within the constitutional legislative domain merely
for the reason that inquiry is made of someone within its walls." Barenblatt, 360
U.S. at 112.
163. An exemption to a conduct restriction for expressive conduct only
occurs if the actor "intends to convey a particularized message" and "the likeli-
hood [is] great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it."
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (quoting Spencer v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11
(1974)).
164. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding a con-
viction of someone charged with burning his selective service registration even
though his burning of his card was expressive conduct).
165. Id. at 376.
166. Regardless of this challenge, Congress would still have the power to
outlaw the use of the instrumentalities of commerce to create a child.
167. See supra text accompanying note 135. Regardless of this challenge,
Congress would still have the power to regulate the use of the instrumentalities
of commerce to create a child and to protect instrumentalities or persons
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should never be considered to be "in" commerce. Moreover,
treating the creation of a human as commerce creates some seri-
ous ethical and constitutional implications. 68 For instance, the
Thirteenth Amendment 169 stands for the proposition that
human life should not be treated as chattel. 7 ' Thus, tying bans
on cloning to a commerce power portrays the message that
human clones are just that-commerce. Of course, Congress
could legitimately outlaw commercial transactions involving com-
merce or even developing a human clone as a service. These
restrictions would not violate the Thirteenth Amendment
because surely Congress has the ability to exclude something
from interstate commerce, 171 and by the very act of excluding
cloning from commerce Congress is sending the proper message
that humans should not be cloned for commercial purposes.
Excluding a procedure from the commercial realm does not,
however, equal a total ban on cloning but a total ban on com-
mercial cloning. Thus, the Thirteenth Amendment may well call
for the HCPA to be narrowed to allow pro-bono cloning that is
not materially related to a commercial scheme.172 Normally,
these exempted cloning instances would be banned under the
Commerce Power's "effects" prong, but in this instance banning
cloning as "an effect" of commerce may send a message contrary
to the Thirteenth Amendment. Nevertheless, because the HCPA
within those instrumentalities, including the banning or regulating the trans-
porting of human clones.
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate com-
merce .... Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from
intrastate activities. . . . Finally, Congress' commerce authority
includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial rela-
tion to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (citations omitted).
168. The ethical implications will be discussed infra Part VIII(A).
169. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (1865). "Section 1. Neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place sub-
ject to their jurisdiction. Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this
article by appropriate legislation." Id.
170. See Esther Slater McDonald, Note, Patenting Human Life and the
Rebirth of the Thirteenth Amendment, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming
2003).
171. See Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (excluding lottery tickets
from commerce).
172. The "commercial scheme" restriction should be added to prevent
scientists from doing voluntary cloning as a means to gain information that will
allow them to materially benefit from the pro bono activities.
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is a total ban on somatic cell nuclear transfer cloning, the Court
will likely find that Congress is not sending a message that
humans are chattel, but that humans should never to a part of a
commercial system, which is the message of the Thirteenth
Amendment.
V. PROPOSALS TO STRENGTHEN THE HCPA
Although the HCPA may be constitutional and fairly effec-
tive in relation to its counterparts, Congress could improve the
bill to solidify its constitutional authority and allow the bill to be
more effective.
A. Enhancing Constitutional Authority
Although the HCPA would likely be found constitutional
under the Commerce Clause, 173 Congress could take a few steps
to either eliminate or narrow the possible gap that may exist with
a conservative interpretation of the "substantially affects" test.
1. Prohibit Human Cloning Under the Enforcement Clause
of the 13th Amendment
Because of the ethical and constitutional implications and
the Court's ability to narrow the statute to only commercial clon-
ing, Congress should enact the ban on cloning under the
enforcement clause of the Thirteenth Amendment.174 Although
the Supreme Court has not ruled as to whether extracting stem
cells from embryos, harvesting organs from clones, or producing
a clone for one's own benefit or desires violates the Thirteenth
Amendment, this should not deter Congress from enforcing the
amendment. In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed that the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, a similarly constructed amendment, allows Congress to
remedy or prevent injuries caused by unconstitutional acts if
there is "congruence and proportionality between the injury to
be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end."'7 5 When human embryonic clones are developed for
research purposes or for the benefit of the donor, the clone, a
173. See supra Section IV(D).
174. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
175. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (establishing that
while Congress does not have the power to determine the rights established in
the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress does have the power to remedy or pre-
vent unconstitutional actions if there is congruence and proportionality
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end).
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human life, is inherently dehumanized and stripped of individ-
ual dignity as she is used simply as research material-without
her consent-or as a donor-making instrument. This treatment
of human life strikes at the heart of the Thirteenth Amendment,
and thus, the Court will likely agree that the HCPA is enforcing
that which is unconstitutional under the Thirteenth
Amendment. 17 6
2. Attach Legislative Findings
Although Congress does not need to include legislative find-
ings for a bill to be constitutional, they may "enable [the courts]
to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question
substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such
substantial effect was visible to the naked eye." '17 7 The precursor
to the HCPA, H.R. 1644, included legislative findings.17 These
findings were not attached to HCPA, however, before it passed
the House of Representatives.' 79 Thus, to help show the court
that human cloning would substantially affect commerce, Con-
gress should commission studies and make findings to attach to
its human cloning ban.
3. Prohibit Human Cloning Activities under the "Postal
Power"
Although the text prohibits shipping, receiving, and import-
ing embryonic clones or products made from embryonic clones,
the bill does not explicitly claim that Congress' Postal Power
could be exercised to prohibit shipping them in the mail sys-
tem.'8 ° In addition, the text should be amended to prohibit any
activity in furtherance of a plan to clone a human-mirroring
the federal mail fraud statute-or should amend the mail fraud
statute to prohibit similar human cloning activities."81 Thus, any
176. See generally McDonald, supra note 170 (arguing that cloning violates
the Thirteenth Amendment).
177. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563 (1995).
178. See H.R. 1644, 107th Cong. § 2 (2001).
179. See supra note 86.
180. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7; see also Ex parte Rapier, 143 U.S. 110
(1892) (stating that Congress need not have jurisdiction over a crime or immo-
rality to forbid the use of the mail system to aid in the perpetration of a crime
or immorality). This proposal, of course, would still allow clonists to use private
carriers, but would nevertheless restrict the ability of clonists to transport
supplies.
181. 18 U.S.C. §1341 (1994).
Whoever... places in any post office or authorized depository for mail
matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the
Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be deposited any matter or
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action, attempt, or participation that included the mail system
would be prosecutable, regardless if it substantially affected
commerce.
4. Prohibit Human Cloning under the "Admiralty Power"
For the federal government to prohibit human cloning in
admiralty jurisdictions, Congress "must first make an act a crime,
affix a punishment to it, and declare the Court that shall have
jurisdiction of the offence." 182 Thus, the HCPA should include
language similar to the federal murder statute 83 to convey to the
courts jurisdiction to enforce and decide violations of the HCPA.
If such language was included, the HCPA would be enforceable
not only on the high seas within the United States admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction, but also on any land reserved or acquired
by the United States, any U.S. military base, any aircraft owned by
a U.S. citizen or corporation, or any U.S. space craft.184
Although the possibility of human cloning occurring on a boat,
plane, or a government area to avoid prosecution may seem
unthinkable, doctors are currently performing abortions just off
the shores of countries that refuse to legalize abortions to cir-
cumvent those countries' laws.1 85 Thus, these types of acts
should not be overlooked, and this precautionary measure
should be taken now.
5. Include a Severability Clause
Congress should seek to protect the HCPA against constitu-
tional challenges by including a severability clause. This clause
will shield the remaining features of the statute should one fail to
thing whatever to be sent or delivered by any private or commercial
interstate carrier, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or
thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or such carrier
according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is
directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any
such matter or thing [shall be liable.]
Id.
182. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812); see also United States
v. Bevans, 16 U.S. 336 (1818) (holding that murder committed on a ship is not
a federal crime unless Congress conferred admiralty jurisdiction on the court).
183. See 18 U.S.C § 1111(b) (1994) ("Within the special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the United States, Whoever is guilty of murder ...
184. See 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1994).
185. See Carl Honore, Abortion Clinic Sails Into Irish Indignation: Anti-abor-
tion Groups Accuse Crew of the Aurora of Peddling Murder on the High Seas: Women on
Waves, NAT'L PosT, June 16, 2001, at A13. Euthanasia advocates may soon
attempt a similar method. See David Batty, Doctor Plans Euthanasia Boat in UK
Waters, GuARDIAN, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk-news/story/0,
3604,509129,00.html (June 19, 2001).
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pass constitutional muster. In addition, if the Act's application to
any person causes a constitutional conflict, the court would not
immediately declare the law unconstitutional as applied to every-
one but would instead evaluate whether another application of
the statute would not violate the Constitution. Therefore, Con-
gress should seek to enact a severability clause with the
legislation. 186
B. Increasing the HCPA 's Effectiveness
Congress should also amend the current proposal to
increase its effectiveness. Establishing certain rules of construc-
tion and conveying selective interpretive authority to an adminis-
trative agency would prevent courts from narrowing the statute.
Furthermore, allowing private enforceability and increasing the
Act's statute of limitations will provide more opportunities for
the HCPA to be enforced. Moreover, creating a conspiracy
charge within the proposed statute and lowering its state of mind
requirement will allow prosecutors more flexibility in enforcing
the prohibition on human cloning.
1. Establishing Friendly Rules of Construction and a Non-
Preemption Clause
The HCPA will be more effective if courts applied
prosecutorial friendly rules of construction. As discussed in Part
PV(B), because the statute uses scientific language ambiguity is
likely to arise while interpreting the statute.187 In addition, hav-
ing ambiguities as to the mental culpability requirement of know-
ing a scientific procedure or technique could also cause
enforceability problems.1 8 8 If a statute is overwhelmingly and
principally always decided in favor of the defendant, however, a
statute's effectiveness may become minuscule.18 Thus, the stat-
ute should include a liberal construction clause to override the
usual principle of lenity.'9 °
186. The federal Mail Fraud Statute has a severability clause that states,
"[I]f any provision of [the enacting statute] or the application thereof to any
person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of [the statute] and the
application of the provision to other persons not similarly situated or to other
circumstances [is] not to be affected thereby .... " Mail Fraud Statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
187. See supra notes 111-18 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91452,
§ 904, 84 Stat. 947 (1970) ("The provisions of this title [enacting this chapter
and amending sections 1505, 2516, and 2517 of 18 U.S.C.] shall be liberally
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As a rule of construction, a court also presumes that a fed-
eral law does not preempt a state law.1 91 Therefore, unless Con-
gress conveys its purpose plainly, the courts will construe the
statute so as not to shift the federal-state balance, especially in
the marginal cases. 9 2 This statute, however, does not and
should not seek to preempt state regulations.' 93 In fact, a more
comprehensive and effective policy assumes that jurisdictions are
concurrent and not mutually exclusive.' 94 Therefore, Congress
should also include a clause explicitly stating that the HCPA does
not preempt state and local laws to prevent a judicial
misinterpretation.19 5
2. Expressly Convey Interpretive and Rulemaking Authority to
HHS
Because Congress does not wish to stifle important, morally
acceptable science, Congress should give rulemaking or interpre-
tative authority to the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) as to what scientific techniques are prohibited
under the HCPA.' 96 This authority would allow scientists to peti-
tion HHS to review the legality of new scientific procedures
under the HCPA.' 9 7 "Such determinations, made before any
agency action has been taken, apply only to the petitioner. They
generally predate any actual dispute between the agency and a
party, are rendered by agency staff and are not subject to judicial
construed to effectuate its remedial purposes."). Congress should also explic-
itly state in a bill's text its purpose for the statute to guide the courts in their
interpretations.
191. SeeJones v. United States, 529 U.S. 828, 859 (2000) (Stevens, J., con-
curring) (citing Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978)).
192. See id. at 860 (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349
(1971)).
193. State statutes should not be preempted so states may be able to effec-
tively prosecute cloning violations if the federal legislative or prosecutorial poli-
cies are inadequate to prohibit the cloning occurring in a particular state.
194. See Blakey, supra note 124, at 1176.
195. See, e.g., § 904, 84 Stat. at 947 ("Nothing in this title shall supersede
any provision of Federal, State, or other law imposing criminal penalties or
affording civil remedies in addition to those provided for in this title.").
196. At this point, Congress should only authorize interpretive powers
concerning the HCPA's scientific definitions. The scientific language, defini-
tions, and techniques could become clumsy when trying to fulfill Congress'
objective of banning human cloning. Nevertheless, other parts of the statute
may not present such problems, and thus, I see no reason at this time to dele-
gate such authority to HHS.
197. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
266 (1993) ("Rulings or interpretations, for example, usually involve requests to
determine whether a particular regulation actually applies to certain facts and,
if so, with what result.").
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review."198 Thus, when HHS promulgates rules interpreting the
scientific procedures prohibited in the HCPA and applying Con-
gress' intent to new procedures, those interpretations-rather
than a court's preferred reasoning-will be given controlling
weight "unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly con-
trary to the statute."' 99 Because a ban on cloning should mani-
festly state its objection to any human cloning, granting this
authority to HHS should not result in the creation of executive
loopholes around the HCPA but instead would provide an addi-
tional tool to prevent human cloning while protecting morally
acceptable scientific techniques. Moreover, if the statute
included a broader definition of cloning, HHS could interpret
the HCPA to prohibit any cloning techniques that develop in the
future.
3. Encourage Private Enforceability
Although some countries, like Great Britain, have histori-
cally allowed private citizens to prosecute criminal cases on
behalf of the king,200 the United State's Congress has only
allowed private individuals to enforce criminal statutes in a few
select cases. 201 Private enforcement of the HCPA would increase
the likelihood of the provision's effectiveness. 20 2 Nevertheless, a
plaintiff must have standing to bring the suit,203 which means
that the plaintiff must have suffered an actual injury or will immi-
198. Id. (citing Kixmiller v. SEC, 492 F.2d 641, 643-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
199. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843-44 (1984).
200. For a brief summary of Britain's enforcement policies, see Lynne N.
Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REv. 937, 938-53 (1985).
201. The two most prominent federal examples are antitrust laws, see 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1994), and R.I.C.O., see 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994).
202. "Congress intended to create a private enforcement mechanism that
would deter violators and deprive them of the fruits of their illegal actions, and
would provide ample compensation to the victims of antitrust violations."
Supermarket of Homes, Inc. v. San Fernando Valley Bd. of Realtors, 786 F.2d
1400, 1404 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465,
472 (1982)).
203. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"-an invasion
of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized
and (b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.'" Sec-
ond, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the
conduct complained of-the injury has to be "fairly ... trace[able] to
the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of]
the independent action of some third party not before the court."
Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the
injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision."
Id. at 560-61 (citations omitted).
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nently suffer one.2 0 4 Consequently, if someone was involuntarily
cloned or if the cloning process damaged someone other than
the clone,z°5 he or she would have standing to recover, and a
percentage of the minimum million-dollar civil damage remedy
would allow him or her to enforce the HCPA.20 6 Congress could
also grant a State standing to sue on the principle of parens
patriae on behalf of the human clones or would-be clones.20 7
Thus, States would be able to seek injunctive or other types of
equity relief to prohibit the use of cloning techniques that fall
under the HCPA. Nevertheless, simply creating a clause of pri-
204. See id. at 564 (holding the plaintiff did not have a sufficiently immi-
nent injury to bring a suit, even under a "citizen-suit" provision which theoreti-
cally created a "procedural right").
205. The clone should probably be barred from recovering damages for
simply being born a clone. See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689 (NJ. 1967).
It is basic to the human condition to seek life and hold on to it how-
ever heavily burdened. If [the infant] could have been asked as to
whether his life should be snuffed out before his full term of gestation
could run its course, our felt intuition of human nature tells us he
would almost surely choose life with defects as against no life at all.
Id. at 693; see also Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979).
We recognize that as a mongoloid child, Sharon's abilities will be
more circumscribed than those of normal, healthy children and that
she, unlike them, will experience a great deal of physical and emo-
tional pain and anguish. We sympathize with her plight. We cannot,
however, say that she would have been better off had she never been
brought into the world. Notwithstanding her affliction with Down's
Syndrome, Sharon, by virtue of her birth, will be able to love and be
loved and to experience happiness and pleasure[,] emotions which
are truly the essence of life and which are far more valuable than the
suffering she may endure. To rule otherwise would require us to disa-
vow the basic assumption upon which our society is based. This we
cannot do. Accordingly, we hold that Sharon has failed to state a valid
cause of action founded upon 'wrongful life.'
Id. at 13. But see Charles Bremner, Damages for 'Life Not Worth Living, TIMES
(London), Nov. 18, 2001, at 1 (reporting that the highest appellate court in
France allowed a "wrongful birth" suit in which a handicapped child, Nicolas
Perruche, was allowed to sue his mother's doctor for damages for being born
because the doctor did not report his prenatal illness to his mother who, had
she known, would have aborted him).
206. The RICO statute's private enforcement clause states, inter alia: "Any
person injured.., by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may
sue therefore [sic] in any appropriate United States district court and shall
recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee[.]"
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994).
207. "[TIhe principle of parens patriae . . . 'held in English Law that the
King was the. . . father of all."' 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 87, at 1627 (quoting
C.J. FLAMmANG, THE POLICE AND THE UNDERPROTECTED CHILD 15 (1970)). This
principle gives the State broad authority to affect the child's welfare. 59 AM.
JUR. 2D Parent and Child § 11 (1987).
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vate enforcement would not confer the constitutionally required
standing upon the average individual citizen.2 °8 Congress would
have to create, as it did in the False Claims Act,209 "a concrete
private interest in the outcome of a suit against a private party for
the government's benefit, by providing a cash bounty for the vic-
torious plaintiff."2 'Although Congress may be leery of granting
private enforcement techniques to others, any type of private
enforceability would increase the HCPA's effectiveness and fur-
ther Congress' objective of prohibiting human cloning.
4. Create a Statute of Limitations Exception and a
Controlling Provision
To increase the Act's effectiveness, Congress should create
an exception to 18 U.S.C. § 3282, which imposes a default five-
year statute of limitations requirement on charges filed under
Title 18 that begins after the offense has been committed.21' In
addition, to avoid confusion or a court imposed statute of limita-
tions for civil claims, Congress should include an explicit statute
of limitations provision for civil claims. Because individuals may
look substantially different as children than they do as adults,
detecting cloned individuals with the naked eye before they
reach the age of four and three months would be difficult. Fur-
thermore, typical side effects for clones may not manifest them-
selves until well after the five-year limitation. Additionally,
specially gifted individuals or celebrities who may have been
208. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 (holding that the plaintiff did not have a
sufficiently imminent injury to bring a suit, even under a "citizen-suit" provision
which theoretically created a "procedural right").
209. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (1994). The purpose of the False Claims Act was
"to protect government funds and property from fraudulent claims[ ]" through
private citizens coming forward and initiating false claims action on behalf of
the government. Jonathan M. Kaye & John Patrick Sullivan, Eighth Survey of
White Collar Crime Substantive Crimes: False Claims, 30 AM. CRiM. L. Rnv. 643, 643,
652 (1993). Congress gave the private enforcers a stake in the case as it prom-
ised persons who either substantially contributed to the case that the govern-
ment wins, or won the suit apart from the government, between twenty-five and
thirty percent of the damages. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3730(d) (1)-(2) (1994).
210. See Lujan, 504 U.S at 573. This option is viable but may prove prob-
lematic. Congress would have to create guidelines and limitations to prevent a
public policy problem of over zealous citizens attempting to receive the bounty.
Under the proper framework though, this type of statute may prove useful in
preventing secretive attempts to clone human beings. For an example of some
suggested substantive and procedural guidelines, see 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (1994).
211. "Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no person shall be
prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indict-
ment is found or the information is instituted within five years next after such
offense shall have been committed." 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1994).
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involuntarily cloned would not likely detect that they had been
until the clone reaches a sufficient age of maturity.2 12 Therefore,
although a cloned person can be identified scientifically almost
immediately, for all practical purposes a cloning may not be sus-
pected for quite some time after the clone's birth. Thus, Con-
gress should exempt the HCPA from the federal criminal statute
of limitations. Moreover, because a court is likely to impose a
statute of limitations from an analogous state or federal statute to
limit civil claims,21 Congress should outline a statute of limita-
tions provision that would adequately allow individuals to sue
once they have good reason to believe that a particular cloning
had taken place.2 4
5. Incorporate Conspiracy and Solicitation Charges
Although Title 18 already has a conspiracy and a solicitation
charge, incorporating another conspiracy and solicitation charge
into the HCPA would also increase its effectiveness. For instance,
the general conspiracy charge carries a maximum criminal pen-
alty of five years in prison,21 5 whereas HCPA's maximum is ten
21years.16 In addition, the general solicitation section only applies
to felonies that have "as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against property or against the
person of another. 21' 7 Because many cases violating the HCPA
may not entail physical force against a "person," the general solic-
itation statute would not apply. In addition, providing extra
counts for a federal prosecutor to try a perpetrator may give the
212. For example, if Michael Jordan was involuntarily cloned, his clone
may not be identified until the child reaches high school and his athletic ability
becomes evident.
213. SeeAgency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff& Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143
(1987) (discussing the Court's usual policy of looking to state statutes to imply a
statute of limitations to federal statutes that do not specify, discussing when an
analogous federal statute's statute of limitations should be implied instead of a
state statute's, and holding that RICO's statute of limitations for civil claims is
four years because it is similar to antitrust laws which have a four-year
limitation).
214. A four-year statute of limitations would be proper if it began run-
ning from the time that the plaintiff reasonably believed that she had been
harmed by the cloning procedure. In the case of the private enforcer, the stat-
ute of limitations for his filing could start running from when he had adequate
information to bring the suit.
215. See 18 U.S.C § 371 (1994).
216. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
217. 18 U.S.C. § 373(a) (1994).
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prosecutor leverage in handling the case and in successfully pros-
ecuting offenders.
21 8
6. Heighten the State of Mind Requirement to Recklessly
Although the HCPA's current state of mind requirement of
"knowingly" would definitely help prohibit some human cloning
from occurring, heightening the state of mind requirement to
"recklessly" would increase the HCPA's effectiveness. "To be
reckless, the accused must have been aware of, and have con-
sciously disregarded, a risk that a prohibited result will occur, or
that a material circumstance exists. "219 This requirement would
force scientists to approach new scientific reproductive tech-
niques cautiously and would encourage them to contact the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services or the Department
of Justice to inquire if new techniques are prohibited under the
HCPA.22 ° Thus, scientists who recognize the risk that their pro-
cedure may violate the HCPA but who consciously disregard that
risk and take no measures to prevent violating the statute would
not be exempt from the statute and thus rewarded for their risk-
taking. Moreover, because human cloning is unique, rare, and
inherently immoral, participants who become aware of the risk
that their action may assist a human cloning procedure and yet
disregard such a risk and continue, should also not be rewarded.
In addition, if "knowingly" remained the state of mind for partici-
pants, scientists would simply shield all participants from the
entire process and reward participants for blindly donating
money, bodily tissues including ovum, medical services, and even
218. If the HCPA should contain a private enforcement clause, Congress
should exempt those who participate in a conspiracy or a solicitation from
suing the government for triple damages. This policy would discourage individ-
uals from placing themselves in a position to be solicited and from initiating
their own sting operations. Furthermore, Congress should be cautious about
allowing former conspirators to only benefit from their experience in a conspir-
acy to violate federal law.
219. 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1036-37 (Sanford H. Kadish
ed., 1983).
220. Recklessness would be the most appropriate requisite state of mind
standard if Congress gave the Attorney General or HHS the ability to interpret
the HCPA and to decide whether a technique would fall within the statute.
Otherwise, scientists would fear being prosecuted under the HCPA for perform-
ing new experiments, thus stifling science. Nevertheless, if Congress requires
scientists to inquire as to whether their actions would violate the HCPA, scien-
tists could appeal to HHS before the experiment to ensure safety from prosecu-
tion. Thus, because inquiring scientists could receive legal guidance on their
procedures before they occur, responsible science would not be stifled.
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prenatal surrogate services. 22' Thus, for both enforceability and
public policy reasons, the state of mind should be reduced to
"recklessly."
VI. STATE BANs ON HUMAN CLONING
Six states-California, Louisiana, Michigan, Rhode Island,
Virginia, and Iowa-have passed their own bans on human clon-
ing.222 California law provides a maximum 2 23 civil fine of
$250,000 for every person and one million dollars for every clinic
involved in a human cloning. 224 A violation of the Louisiana stat-
ute could lead to a five million dollar fine 225 or a ten-year prison
sentence for individuals 226 and a ten million dollar fine for clin-
ics or corporations.227 Michigan has the strictest human cloning
laws as their violators are subject to a civil penalty up to ten mil-
lion dollars228 and a criminal penalty of up to fifteen years in
jail.229 Rhode Island's law fines an individual $250,0002'0 and a
clinic one million dollars23 ' for violating its statute. Virginia
penalizes violators of its human cloning law up to $50,00022 and
Iowa assesses a maximum ten-year prison sentence and a ten
thousand dollar fine against violators along with additional fines
221. Although I recommend heightening the state of mind to reckless-
ness for non-scientists, the matter is not as critical, in my view, as heightening
the state of mind for scientists and possibly their financial supporters. The ulti-
mate goal of the HCPA should be to disassemble the financial and intellectual
infrastructure that is required to clone a human. Nevertheless, encouraging lay
participants to be more responsible in donating bodily tissues or prenatal surro-
gate services is generally good public policy.
222. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24,185 (West Supp. 2002) (This
section was repealed on Jan. 1, 2003. Id. § 24,189.); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.36.2 (West 2001) (This section was repealed on Jan. 1, 2003. 1999
La. Acts 788, § 3.); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.430a (West Supp. 2002); R.I.
GEN. LAws § 23-16.4-2 (2001) (This section expires July 7, 2003. Id. § 23-16.4-
4.); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-162.22 (2001); Iowa S. File 2118, 79th Gen. Assemb.,
2d Sess. (Apr. 26, 2002) (to be codified at IOWA CODE ANN. § 707B).
223. The maximum fine in many of the States can be extended for viola-
tors who derive a pecuniary gain from the violation. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 24,187(c).
224. Id. § 24187(a)-(b).
225. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.36.3A(2).
226. Id. § 40: 12299.36.2D.
227. Id. § 40: 12299.36.3A(1).
228. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 333.16,275(3) (West 2001).
229. Id. § 750.430a(3).
230. R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-16.4-3(b) (2001).
231. Id. § 23-16.4-3(a).
232. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-162.22C (2001).
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equaling twice the gross gain achieved by the human cloning.
2 33
All six states ban the somatic cell nuclear transfer technique,
234
but Rhode Island also bans the "twinning" method. 23 5 Further-
more, only the Michigan, Virginia, and Iowa statutes are perma-
nent; the others contain sunset provisions.236 Thus, only three
permanent laws against cloning exist the United States, only two
of which imposes criminal liability.
VII. PROPOSED STATE REFORMS TO BAN HuMAN CLONING
Although Congress could pass an effective ban on human
cloning, Congress cannot insure that the law will be strictly
enforced. Therefore, both the federal government and state and
local governments need to pass effective bans on human cloning
to create an adequate and comprehensive national policy against
human cloning.
23 7
A. Proposed Legislation to Ban Cloning & Destructive
Embryonic Research
Just as lawmakers in Congress are offering both strict and
permissive proposals in Congress, state lawmakers are also offer-
ing both types in state legislatures. But, to avoid an incoherent
policy on cloning and to effectively prohibit it, any new state leg-
islation should look similar to H.R. 2505. The aspects of the
HCPA that have been previously discussed would apply to a
potential state proposal as well. Moreover, the HCPA should also
233. Compare Iowa S. File 2118, § 4(3)(a), 79th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess.
(Apr. 26, 2002) (to be codified at IOWA CODE ANN. § 707B.4.3.(a)), with IOWA
CODE § 902.9.3 (Supp. 2002).
234. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24,185(c) (West Supp. 2002) (This
section was repealed on Jan. 1, 2003. Id. § 24,189.); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.36.1 (West 2001) (This section is repealed on Jan. 1, 2003. 1999 La.
Acts 788, § 3.); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 333.16,274(5) (a); § 23-16.4-1; VA.
CODE ANN. § 32.1-162.21; Iowa S. File 2118, § 3(2) (to be codified at IOWA CODE
ANN. §707B.3.2).
235. R.I. GEN. LAws § 2-16.4-2(a).
236. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24,189; 1999 La. Acts. 788, § 1; LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.36.2; R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-16.4-4.
237. Thus, no federal legislation should preempt a state ban. See supra
note 126 and accompanying text. In addition, state governments should be
able to prosecute acts of human cloning if the federal government should fail
to bring a suit. Moreover, allowing this duplication would not cause many of
the adverse consequences that may accompany having similar state and federal
criminal statutes because cloning is a new crime, few occurrences are likely to
occur, and federal resources should be devoted to preventing this type of crime.
See TASK FORCE ON FEDERALIZATION OF CRiM. LAW, Am. BAR Ass'N, THE FEDERALI-
ZATION OF CRIMINAL LAw 26-43 (1998) (discussing adverse consequences of
dual criminal statutes) [hereinafter TASK FORCE].
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incorporate the recommendations offered in Part V of this note.
A main difference, though, would be that states would be free to
ban human cloning under their typical police powers instead of a
commerce power.2 38 By using their police power, states would be
able to take a more comprehensive approach to deterring
cloning.
In addition to the general cloning ban, states should pass
legislation criminalizing experimenting on embryos. As of Octo-
ber 1, 2001, eleven states have outlawed destructive embryo
research.2 3 9 South Dakota recently passed such a bill that made
knowingly conducting nontherapeutic research that destroys an
embryo and nontherapeutic research that subjects an embryo to
substantial risk of injury or death illegal.2 4 ° Similar bans should
be included among the proposed human cloning bills offered on
the state level. However, as with the federal and state HCPAs,
rulemaking authority for the scientific definitions should be
given to a state administrative agency with clear guidelines to pre-
238. Obviously, states would not be able to incorporate the Postal or
Admiralty Powers or use the enforcement clause of the Thirteenth
Amendment.
239. AMs. UNITED FOR LIFE, POLICY GUIDE 18 (Nov. 2001).
240. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-14-16 to -20 (Michie Supp. 2002).
No person may knowingly conduct nontherapeutic research that
destroys a human embryo. A violation of this section is a Class 1
misdemeanor.
Id. § 34-14-16.
No person may knowingly conduct nontherapeutic research that sub-
jects a human embryo to substantial risk of injury or death. No person
may sell or transfer a human embryo with the knowledge that the
embryo will be subjected to nontherapeutic research. A violation of
this section is a Class 1 misdemeanor.
Id. § 34-14-17.
No person may use for research purposes cells or tissues that the per-
son knows were obtained by performing the activities described in
§§ 34-14-16 and 34-14-17. A violation of this section is a Class 1
misdemeanor.
Id. § 34-14-18.
For purposes of §§ 34-14-16 to 34-14-20, inclusive, the term, nonthera-
peutic research, means research that is not intended to help preserve
the life and health of the particular embryo subjected to risk. It does
not include in vitro fertilization and accompanying embryo transfer to
a woman's body or any diagnostic test which may assist in the future
care of a child subjected to such tests.
Id. § 34-14-19.
For purposes of §§ 34-14-16 to 34-14-20, inclusive, the term, human
embryo, means a living organism of the species Homo sapiens at the
earliest stages of development (including the single-celled stage) that
is not located in a woman's body.
Id. § 34-14-20.
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vent courts from finding that the scientific definitions are too
vague.241
B. Proposed Reforms for State Cloning Bans
1. Revoke Licenses from Individuals and Businesses Affiliated
with Human Cloning
Because States are primarily responsible for issuing licenses
to professionals, states should add a provision to revoke the per-
petrator's professional business license as an additional punish-
ment. This policy would not only deter individuals and
companies from participating in cloning activities, but also would
prevent the perpetrator from attempting to clone again in the
state. Iowa and Louisiana have recently established such a pun-
ishment as a part of their anti-cloning policies. Nevertheless, a
state could even enact a separate statute with a lesser state of
mind or a broader definition of cloning to give the government
more discretion in denying renewals of such licenses than in the
typical criminal trial. Thus, the government would have more
recourse to prevent companies and doctors from proceeding in
suspicious experiments or endeavors that may produce a clone.
2. Exclude Benefits from Biotech Firms Affiliated with
Human Cloning
States should also take measures to deter companies that
receive general state benefits from affiliating with human cloning
procedures or doing business with companies that clone humans
or use products made from human cloning experiments. For
instance, the State of Michigan excludes biotech firms who par-
ticipate in human cloning or embryonic research from receiving
state tax credits.242 Because corporations often receive some
state benefits, this tool would be useful in deterring corporations
from investing in cloning activities, especially if a federal ban has
not been enacted.
VIII. AN ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR A POLICY DISCUSSION
Developing public policies requires a conceptual ethical
groundwork on which the policies should be based. This frame-
work should consider not only the purpose of the policies and
what the policies should accomplish, but also what the policies
should not do. In establishing what decisions and procedures
241. See, e.g., Forbes v. Napolitano, 247 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2000).
242. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 2 0 7 .8 03(g) (iii) (West Supp. 2002); Id.
§ 207.808.
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are ethical and unethical, the approach that ethicists use varies,
which not surprisingly causes their outcomes to vary as well.
Thus, this section will discuss the four approaches that a modern
ethicist is likely to take. Moreover, this section will discuss which
aspects of public policy decisions are bound by the rules of eth-
ics. Furthermore, this section will recommend a conceptual
framework in which society should evaluate the various types of
human cloning bans.
A. Ethical Approaches
1. Principle Ethics
Principlism is an approach some ethicists use to make a deci-
sion about a particular situation in light of an abstract principle.
Moral principles, under this approach, are general standards of
conduct in society "that describe[ ] obligations, permissible
actions, and ideals of action." '243 The principles are guidelines in
determining a condition's "permissibility, obligatoriness, right-
ness, or aspirational quality[.] ' '244 Such established principles
are usually consistent with other, more particular moral rules
and focus on moral obligations that are impartial.245 One can
establish a principle by evaluating current society and its norms,
by asserting a principle consistent with those norms, and by
developing a consensus on the validity of those norms. Thus,
these norms are subjective to societies but are typically imple-
mented as objective, or as the standard, for individuals within
society. Generally though, the ethic does not rest on the concept
of a discernable, objective truth. Consequently, the principle
ethic rests more on what are the societal norms versus what they
ought to be.246
The four most notably accepted principles that principlists
accept are:
(1) respect for autonomy (a principle of respect for the
decision-making capacities of autonomous persons); (2)
nonmaleficence (a principle of avoiding the causation of
harm to others); (3) beneficence (a group of principles for
243. Tom L. Beauchamp, Principles and Other Emerging Paradigms in Bioeth-
ics, 69 IND. L.J. 955 (1994), reprinted in A HEALTH LAW READER: AN INTERDISCIPLI-
NARY APPROACH 22 (John H. Robinson et al. eds., 1999).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (L.A. Selby-Bigge &
P.H. Nidditch eds., 1978) (introducing the "is/ought" distinction as a criticism
against natural law theorists by concluding that just because something "is" in
society or nature does not necessarily mean it "ought" to be that way).
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providing benefits and balancing benefits against risks and
costs); and (4) justice (a group of principles for fairly dis-
tributing benefits, risks, and costs).247
Principle ethics does have its constraints, as principles can
often be underdetermined, ambiguous, and difficult to apply in
specific situations.2 48 Moreover, because principles are based on
common norms and are not deduced from a larger philosophical
thought but from common norms, the theory gives no guidance
when two or more principles conflict.2 49 Furthermore, principle
ethicists generally consider principles as suggestions and not
imperatives, which turns principle ethicists from deciding their
ethics based on a principle to having to first discuss the appropri-
ateness of principle at the beginning decision-making process.
2 50
Consequently, principle ethics fails to provide a sense of certainty
for those who apply that approach.
2. Values Ethics
The values ethics approach proposes that particular deci-
sions should be based upon the values society holds. This
approach is similar to a very abstract and general principle
approach, but value ethics are concerned more with policy than
with principles and are skeptical of rules.2 5 1 A values ethicist
attempts to look beyond principles to their premises, and thus
subsequent decisions are based not just on a principle but also
the principle's purpose. Values are also based on societal con-
sensus and are thus subjective rather than objective. Because val-
ues ethics will incorporate a principle's purpose or will propose
an outcome more inline with societal values, applying value eth-
ics to a particular situation could be relatively simple when the
controlling value is clear. When values conflict, whichever value
a society more highly esteems will control. In practice, discern-
ing which value is held higher in society could be difficult. In
247. Beauchamp, supra note 243, at 23. This paradigm represents only a
categorization of its underlining principles. Thus, the four-principle paradigm
resembles a values ethic discussed in the next section.
248. See K. Danner Clouser & Bernard Gert, A Critique of Principlism, 15J.
MED. & PHIL. 219 (1990), reprinted in A HEALTH LAW READER: AN INTERDISCIPLI-
NARY APPROACH, supra note 243, at 28.
249. See id.
250. See id. at 28-29.
251. This approach resembles the American Realist's approach to law
that developed in the first half of the twentieth century in the United States.
American Realists were concerned about the consequences of decision and the
"rightness" of the outcome and were skeptical about rules and mechanically
applying them to every situation. See HILAIRE MCCOUBREY & NIGEL D. WHITE,
TEXTBOOK ON JURISPRUDENCE 202-03 (3d ed. 1999).
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addition, several values may converge to form a societal consen-
sus on a principle that otherwise would not have developed had
society only been given the option to form the principle off of
one of the converging values. In the long-run, special interest
groups will compete to promote their values over others to
develop an overarching value that could cause ethicists to have
tunnel vision and over focus on a particular value.2 52
3. Situational Ethics
A situational ethicist, like a principle or values ethicist, is
also aware of the community's ethical standard and the commu-
nity's heritage, but is willing to compromise those standards if
doing so would seem to better serve a greater good or pur-
pose.253 Thus, a situational ethicist focuses on the "contextual
appropriateness" of the act and therefore does not focus on
whether the act is good or right but whether it would be an
appropriate fit given the circumstances.254 Situational ethicists
do not completely disregard all rules but are aware of the circum-
stances that allow them to deviate or weigh against the rules.2 55
In a sense, situational ethics is a reaction to a rigid principle-
based ethics and a dominant value-based ethics because it allows
the individual to reason to a conclusion by taking into account
those principles, values, and his situation. This approach is simi-
lar to natural law in part because it accepts reason as the instru-
ment of moral judgment, but it differs significantly from natural
law because situational ethics rejects that a discernable objective
standard-such as the virtuous person-exists.2 56
The strength of situational ethics is that it allows the ethicist
to assess the facts in light of the principles and values and thus,
no gaps exist between what one thinks should occur and what
does. This approach violates the rule of external consistency,
however,-the rule that claims that which applies in one case
should apply in all-because similar situations may not be
treated similarly.257 Moreover, although situational ethicists may
252. For an example of where this ethic may lead, see id. at 240-41,
which contains a discussion of how focusing on capitalism and individuality has
produced isolation, passivity, and disconnectedness in society.
253. See JOSEPH FLETCHER, SITUATIONAL ETHICS: THE NEW MoRAUtYn 26
(1966).
254. See id. at 27-28.
255. See id. at 28-29.
256. See id. at 26.
257. See id. at 32. Although a particular person may make the same
choice in the same situation, he is not ethically bound to do so. If he were
bound, even by just reason, a rule would then exist and could be applied, which
would eliminate the situational ethic system and admit that principlism is the
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still find some principles helpful when making decisions, individ-
uals generally must wrestle with ethical dilemmas with little gui-
dance as to what the circumstances actually call for them to
do.2 "8 Therefore, decisions in similar situations may become
unpredictable.
4. Virtue Ethics
Virtue ethicists focus less on the actual functions of a proce-
dure to determine if that action is ethically acceptable, but look
more broadly to the character of the agent, the nature of the act,
the circumstances surrounding the act, and its consequences.259
Hence, virtue ethicists emphasize the actor and see the actor's
morality as based on whether her actions were "a matter of good
or virtuous practice. '260 Whether an act is virtuous is based on
whether a virtuous person would have acted similarly in that situ-
ation. A virtuous person is one who embodies virtuous traits,
which are those that "habitually disposed humans to act in
accord with the ends of human nature."26' Virtue ethics presup-
poses an objective moral order and a concept of a human nature
that could be discovered through reason, and therefore, an act
would be no less virtuous if a society embraced or condemned
the act.262 Aquinas claimed to have reasoned that the following
were human goods and thus virtuous: life, knowledge, play, aes-
thetics, friendship, and practical reasonableness (or
judgment) .263
As a whole, virtue ethics has a lot to offer, as it draws atten-
tion to the moral development of individuals. The belief in
objective morality also tends to resonate with the belief that some
real system but that principlism is just underdetermined. Thus, most situa-
tional ethicists question whether any situation is identical to another situation
and are skeptical about drawing any generalizations. See id.
258. Individuals must still contemplate, usually in the heat of the
moment, if ethically the circumstances allow them to deviate from the principle
and, if so, whether they should. This situation could cause undue stress and
continual second-guessing and force individuals to make decisions in the least
opportune situations, which may inadvertently cause emotion to displace rea-
son in the decision-making process.
259. See Edmund D. Pellegrino, Toward a Virtue-Based Normative Ethics for
the Health Professions, 5 KENNEDY INST. OF ETHICS J. 253 (1995), reprinted in A
HEALTH LAw READER: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH, supra note 243, at 43.
260. Id.
261. Id. For Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, the end of human nature was
fulfillment in natural happiness, and for Aquinas the end of human nature was
the supernatural happiness realized union with God. See id.
262. See id. at 44.
263. See generally JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL
THEORY (1998).
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acts are wrong in and of themselves. 64 Nevertheless, opinions
differ widely as to how to discern objective morality or even
whether objective morality is ascertainable at all. Consequently,
unless a modern society reaches a consensus as to the basics of
the virtue theory, America's philosophical pluralism makes the
application of such a theory difficult.265
B. Ethical Restraints
In evaluating whether a public policy proposal is ethically
permissible, a society must scrutinize the ethics of the proposal's
end and means. If each of these two aspects of the policy is ethi-
cally sound, the public policy is permissible. If one aspect should
fail, however, the public policy should not been enacted. Moreo-
ver, even if the policy is ethically permissible, the policy's effects
should be scrutinized, and if the effects are ethically questiona-
ble, the policy should be reconsidered.
1. "End" Restraints
Subjecting a policy's end to ethical scrutiny lies at the heart
of ethics, regardless of the approach used. Describing an aspect
of a policy as an "end" can be confusing, however, especially
when improperly distinguished from a motivation, a means, or
an effect. In the context of our discussion, an "end" is what the
individual intends the policy to do. For instance, for a school
district rearranging its educational system for the purpose of
increasing its students' literacy, thus causing the children to be
segregated by race, the literacy is the end. The end is legitimate
because it is not ethically objectionable to seek to increase the
student body's literacy. However, if the goal was to segregate stu-
dents by race and that had happened to increase student literacy,
the end would be the segregation of students, which would be
morally objectionable. Thus, the intended purpose, whether
stated or hidden, is critical in ethically evaluating a policy's end.
264. A few examples of things that American society holds as objectively
wrong come to mind. For instance, few argue that slavery was moral in America
in the Eighteenth and early Nineteenth centuries despite the fact that societal
consensus indicated that slavery was acceptable. Moreover, few argue that the
holocaust in Nazi Germany was morally acceptable although the acts were legal.
Thus, many in American society hold that slavery and the holocaust were objec-
tively wrong-wrong regardless of place and time-and therefore, on some
level, a few objective morals must exist.
265. See generally Pellegrino, supra note 259, at 43-50 (claiming that virtue
ethics is workable in professional ethic environments, including the medical
profession).
20031 A COMPREHENSIE NATIONAL POLICY TO STOP HUMAN CLONING 263
2. "Means" Restraints
In evaluating a policy, the means used to accomplish the
desired "end" must also pass ethical scrutiny. In other words, the
means are an independent limitation on the end. Although
much of our law has focused on maximizing preferences, as a
society we have realized that we cannot travel every path that
leads to a desired destination. For instance, society encourages
racial equality but finds it impermissible to fire a host of people
based upon their race, even if the firing would lead to racial
equality.266 For most policies, we weigh the end in light of the
means if the means are ethically acceptable. 267
C. Ethical Evaluation
Each of the four approaches to ethics is represented in some
form in American society. American society, including the legal,
medical, and scientific community, is ethically pluralistic. Thus,
developing a consensus within those communities as to which
approach should be used is unlikely. Just because something
ethically could happen, however, does not necessarily mean that
it should. In other words, pluralism requires toleration and
respect of each other's views. In the field of ethics, this means
that personally refraining from what others may deem to be
unethical may be the proper response. It was for this reason that
the NBAC recommended that Congress outlaw all human clon-
ing efforts. 2 1 Unfortunately, ACT, CLONAID, and other clon-
ing scientists have failed to accord such respect.
In an ethically diverse society, a policy on human cloning
should be created so as not to ethically offend a sizeable segment
of the population. This approach undoubtedly disfavors situa-
tional ethicists. Nevertheless, in a pluralistic society how could
one individual's judgment as to another individual's (or poten-
tial individual's) status not be subject to the community at large
while still maintaining law or a civil and non-chaotic society no
266. See Crumpton v. Bridgeport Educ. Ass'n, 993 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir.
1993) (finding the policy of firing only white teachers because of their race
when layoffs are required is an impermissible means to achieving racial
equality).
267. This is represented by the Supreme Court's standard strict scrutiny
test. See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)
(applying strict scrutiny and upholding a prohibition of corporate contribu-
tions and independent expenditures by weighing means used by the state-
restricting corporate speech-with the State interest in preventing the distor-
tion of the political process-the end).
268. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
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less? Therefore, this Note proposes two common principles
269
on which to judge cloning policies: (1) human beings should not
be subjected to harmful experimentation without informed con-
sent and (2) human beings should not be treated as property.
1. No Harmful Experimentations Without Informed Consent
The principle of informed consent applies when the subject
has the ability to give consent or where the experimentation
would not personally benefit the subject. Both internationally
and domestically, this principle has proven to serve just results
and thus, unless universal consensus can be reached again
regarding medical research, this principle should control.
Under the virtue theory, human life, and more specifically the
conservation of oneself, is a basic good, which includes the good
of health and bodily integrity. 270 Consequently, one's health and
bodily integrity should not be compromised under the virtue the-
ory. Moreover, under this theory individuals cannot risk the life
of a non-aggressor, even to save their own lives, as "every act
which is intended, whether as end or means, to kill an innocent
human being; and every act done by a private person, which is
intended to kill any human being" is unethical.27' Under the
predominant principle-based theory in the medical profession,
this principle is firmly established by three of its four competing
principles. Without informed consent, autonomy of the human
subject is compromised as she is either denied the choice to con-
sent or her choice is ignored. In addition, its principle of
nonmaleficence is also violated as the experimentation not only
fails to avoid harm but increases the likelihood of harm to the
subject. Moreover, its principle of justice is violated in the clon-
ing context as the clone fails to personally and imminently suffer
from illness that the research hopes to cure. Under American
consensus values, the informed consent principle has wide sup-
port, typically under the value of human dignity.272 Some have
challenged this proposition stating the human cloning furthers
human dignity because of the positive effects may lead to preserv-
269. This Note uses principles because in a pluralistic society principles
are more accommodating as several values and virtues may lead to the same
principle. Because various virtues and values are embodied in these principles,
they are not simply asserted and neither are they underdetermined for the pur-
poses of evaluating cloning policies.
270. See FINNIS, supra note 263, at 81 (describing Aquinas' theory on
human goods).
271. Id. at 141.
272. See Richard W. Garnett, Why Informed Consent? Human Experimenta-
tion and the Ethics of Autonomy, 36 CATH. LAw. 455 (1996).
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ing human life. This theory is flawed, however, because although
the end serves human dignity, the means of forcing human
experimentation does not. In addition, if values theorists
applied the consensus values of the Western society, they would
clearly support this principle, as it was the basis of assessing guilt
for Nazi doctors during the Nuremberg trials 273 and would likely
be accepted in the cloning context as well. 274 Therefore, because
the principle of informed consent is widely supported, it should
be applied when deciding whether a policy is ethically
acceptable.
2. Human Beings Should Never Be Treated as Commerce
Though this principle is almost universally accepted, many
politicians and policymakers are tempted to subtly cross this line.
To do so however, would be ethically unacceptable. Under the
values approach, American society appears to be strongly against
deeming human beings chattel. The emancipation proclama-
tion and its later codification in the Thirteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution ended slavery in America. Moreo-
ver, women's rights movements have helped women achieve
equal legal and social status in the United States, ending an era
when they were perceived by the law as property. Principlism
also seems to be against treating individuals as property as it
would violate its principles of justice and respect for individual
autonomy. Virtue ethicists would also oppose treating humans as
property, as "all human beings are both free and equal."275
Although some aspects of American society-such as the move-
ment to repeal prostitution laws, the advocating of a market-
driven organ donation system, and even a continued commit-
ment to capitalism-may indicate a contrary value, these
instances are typically not portrayed as treating humans as chat-
tel. Thus, they remain the exceptions and not the rule.
273. See id. at 469-71. The first criteria in the Nuremberg Code's section
on scientific research stated, "The voluntary consent of the human subject is
absolutely essential." Id. at 469 n.67 (quoting THE NAzi DOCTORS AND THE
NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 2 (George J.
Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992)).
274. See supra Part I.
275. FINNIS, supra note 263, at 170 ("'Free' here refers both to the radical
capacity for free choices, in which one is master of oneself, and to one's free-
dom from any justified domination by other human persons; to be free is to
be-unlike a slave-an end in oneself.").
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D. Unethical Proposals
1. FDA Regulation and Partial Protection
The FDA has claimed that it has the power to regulate
human cloning under a statute interpretation in which embry-
onic clones are considered "articles. 276 In this situation, the
FDA undoubted has an ethically acceptable end, prohibiting
human cloning. In fact, with the absence of federal cloning leg-
islation and with the cloning of humans occurring, some might
advocate such a measure. But, although the end is ethical, the
means to accomplish the end violates the universal principle that
human beings should not be treated as chattel. Consequently,
this approach is ethically unacceptable and should be rejected.
Congress has also proposed allowing some types of cloning,
like therapeutic cloning, while banning other types of cloning,
namely reproductive cloning under the Commerce Clause.
Again, the end of preventing reproductive cloning is ethically
acceptable, but the use of the Commerce Clause in this case is
not. Under a total cloning ban, Congress would be tacitly
acknowledging that human cloning should not be a part of com-
merce at all, which reinforces the universal principle. By passing
a law allowing some cloning to occur, however, Congress is con-
veying the message that cloning is legitimately a part of com-
merce and that only some subset of cloning should not occur.
Consequently, if Congress desires to regulate the transportation
or selling of embryonic clones or products of cloning embryos,
or the creating of embryos for a fee under the Commerce Clause,
Congress must impose a total ban for its action to be ethically
acceptable.277 Therefore, Congress would either have to pass a
total ban or assert the ban under another power, possibly the
Thirteenth Amendment.
2. Allowing Therapeutic Cloning While Prohibiting
Reproductive Cloning
Along with deeming clones as commerce, a congressional
policy of allowing therapeutic cloning while banning reproduc-
tive cloning creates other ethical issues. First, the law allows
embryonic clones to be created, but unlike extra embryos from
in vitro fertilizations, these embryonic clones may never be
276. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
277. Congress or the FDA could ethically regulate the use of any chemi-
cals, facilities, or corporations that perform cloning research under the Com-
merce Clause. In addition, Congress could depend solely upon its channels
and instrumentality portions of the commerce clause power to enact legislation
that restricts cloning.
2003] A COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL POLICY TO STOP HUMAN CLONING 267
implanted because the law prohibits it. Thus, no one will legally
be able to carry the embryo to term, and few would rescue the
embryo for fear of the criminal or civil sanctions. Therefore, this
law would in effect order the death of these embryos, and as a
public policy, this approach would encourage the creation and
deaths of thousands of embryos. Forcing the deaths of
thousands of embryonic clones is unmistakably ethically
unacceptable.
Because human cloning is allowed for research purposes
only, this policy would also violate the universal principle of
informed consent. The purpose of those advocating researching
of embryonic clones has not been to administer therapy to them
in hopes of saving their own lives. Instead, the focus of the
research has been to cure the diseases affecting the rest of soci-
ety, including the clone's parent. Thus, because the human
embryo is a human being and because she cannot and has not
given her consent, performing harmful research on her is plainly
unacceptable. This research clearly violates a proposition that
virtue-, value-, and principle-based ethicists largely support and
violates the standards used to convict Nazi doctors during the
Nuremberg trials.
IX. CONCLUSION
Establishing a national policy against human cloning
requires adherence to general ethical standards. That being
said, the federal government should join the other nations in the
international community who have attempted to ban human
cloning. Because of the international interest and the dynamics
of human cloning, human cloning is both a federal issue and a
state issue. The HCPA would be a good and effective first step
toward banning human cloning. Nevertheless, Congress should
make several amendments to the proposed ban to increase its
effectiveness. These proposals include instilling friendly rules of
construction, giving HHS interpretive authority over the scien-
tific subsections of the statute, creating its own expressed statute
of limitations, and adding its own conspiracy and solicitation
charge. Moreover, the HCPA is constitutional because the Court
has not recognized a right to create a child and because the
HCPA does not implicate the First Amendment. In light of the
Supreme Court's recent change in its Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence, however, the HCPA should include legislative findings
and incorporate Congress's Postal Power, Admiralty Power, and
its Enforcement Power of the Thirteenth Amendment. In addi-
tion, each state should pass a similar ban on human cloning to
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allow state officials to enforce the ban and to police cloning activ-
ities. Moreover, states should pass acts prohibiting the destruc-
tion of embryos for research purposes to give further
disincentives for researchers to clone embryos within their bor-
ders. If the recommended HCPA, and similar state acts, are
enacted, we will be able to stop human cloning within the United
States. Whether Congress and its state counterparts have the will
and the courage to take such a definitive step however, remains
to be seen.
